

Israel Repositioning: Geo-Economics, Permanent Security, the Hexagon Framework and Africa's Eastern Rimland

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Abstract

*This paper argues that Israel's post-7 October strategic repositioning is best understood as the convergence of three logics: (1) a doctrine of **permanent security**, whose genealogy runs from the eliminationist core of settler colonialism, through the colonial way of warfare and counter-insurgency, to the post-2001 Global War on Terror and the present; (2) a geo-economic and security hub project that Benjamin NETANYAHU has named the **hexagon** of regional alliances; and (3) a revitalised **colonial praxis** that draws ideological energy from Christian and white nationalism in the United States and United Kingdom. Following A. Dirk MOSES, the paper treats **permanent security** not as a metaphor but as a determinate political rationality that is at once eliminationist and futurist: the pre-emptive destruction of an adversary's future capacity to threaten. It then reads the **hexagon**, through the Israel Defense Forces' own doctrinal writing at the Dado Center, the ICGS analysis and Prof. Kobi MICHAEL, and thereafter through Daniel LEVY's interpretation of these materials, as the external-regional form of "Greater Israel": not formal annexation of an entire region, but positioning as its dominant if not compulsory hub, with Africa's eastern rimland — including Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somaliland — the Red Sea, the Horn and the corridor to the Indian Ocean — as an already highly contested node, often a joint Israeli-UAE venture. This development has important national security implications not only for East Africa but also for South Africa, with its large Somali refugee and expatriate network. Finally, the paper offers a structural comparison with apartheid South Africa's parallel movement from an outward policy of détente, through regional pre-emptive destabilisation, to a militarised, coercive permanent-security posture — "total war" — a security doctrine that backfired and ultimately failed in a devastating manner. The comparison is structural, not identitarian: both South Africa and Israel were/are apartheid, settler-colonial states using ethno-racial discrimination and partition to engineer ethno-racial majorities where they did not exist; both attempt(ed) to convert isolation into a regional security architecture of military-economic domination, alliances and **permanent security**; and in both cases the manoeuvre expressed a slide towards over-extension and a full-blown regime crisis rather than a secure position of strength.*

1. Two openings: dominion and eradicating the root

Two recent interventions triggered this argument. The first is Daniel LEVY's analysis of what the Israeli right now means by "Greater Israel". LEVY argues that the phrase is no longer reducible to territorial maximalism. It has become a wider geopolitical project in which Israel seeks to become the indispensable organiser of the surrounding region. In his formulation:

"Greater Israel should be seen as a geopolitical and strategic concept as much as a territorial one ... something both more ambitious and more sophisticated than the simple control of territory — a project of dominion ... The current Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has spoken about a regional alliance system — a 'hexagon' — in which Israel is the central node linking the Middle East to Asia, Africa and Europe" (LEVY, 2026).

The second is Alastair CROOKE's description of Israel's war "to the root". CROOKE supplies the name for the underlying military rationality: not deterrence, containment or even periodic punishment, but the systematic dismantling of any present or future capacity to threaten. As CROOKE puts it, the Israeli leadership has come to understand security as the eradication of root causes — an undertaking that "requires not just defeating an enemy force, but destroying the social, demographic and political conditions from which threat might regenerate" (CROOKE, 2026). The phrase that has entered Israeli strategic vernacular is "permanent security", and it shifts attention from the destruction of an enemy force to the destruction of the social, demographic, institutional and territorial conditions from which resistance might regenerate.

These two interventions set the paper's spine. LEVY names the external form: dominion through alliance, corridor control, dependency and security-economic centrality. CROOKE names the internal logic: permanent security and "root cause" eradication, meaning the pre-emptive destruction of an adversary's future capacity. The claim advanced here is that these are not separate developments but two dimensions of a single strategic repositioning. Its closest historical and rather uncanny analogue is apartheid South Africa's movement in the 1970s and 1980s to the outward policy of détente and a Constellation of States (CONSAS), regional economic coercion, covert destabilisation, militarised regional domination, and permanent security under the name of Total Onslaught and Total War.

This requires conceptual precision. A full-blown regime crisis emerges when a ruling order can no longer govern through consent, can no longer stabilise itself through routine institutions, and increasingly relies on coercion, exceptional measures, symbolic mobilisation and external enemies to preserve itself. It is a conjunctural breakdown in which material capacity, institutional coherence, ideological authority and coercive command enter simultaneous contradiction. The regime remains in power and may even look formidable, but its means of rule become visibly exhausted. It substitutes coercion for consent, emergency for legality, propaganda for persuasion and security doctrine for politics. The crisis is therefore not episodic but systemic: it reveals that the regime's underlying formula of rule has become historically exhausted.

Stated plainly, Israel is attempting a strategic repositioning in Southwest Asia and the adjacent eastern rimland of Africa. Three questions organise the analysis:

- First, what exactly is the intent?
- Second, do Israel and its partners have the capabilities to operationalise and enact it successfully?
- Third, what are the implications should it succeed — or should it fail?

The argument proceeds in five steps:

- a conceptual genealogy of permanent security, from the eliminationist core of settler colonialism to the present;
- the ideological fuel supplied by Christian Zionism and white/Christian nationalism;
- the hexagon as a geo-economic, military and security-hub project, read first through the Dado Center, the ICGS and Kobi MICHAEL;
- Africa's eastern rimland as the contested node of that project; and
- the South African comparison and its lesson of failure.

2. Permanent security: from settler elimination to colonial warfare and COIN

Before turning to counter-insurgency, the order of the genealogy must be stated clearly. Settler colonialism is eliminationist by definition. Its primary object is not exploitation in place but replacement: demographic engineering and racial-ethnic fragmentation. The repertoire is recognisable and recurrent — partition, reservations, bantustans, forced removal, expulsion and, at the limit, genocide. Patrick WOLFE's decisive formulation remains the central conceptual anchor: settler colonialism is governed by a "logic of elimination" and "invasion is a structure not an event" (WOLFE, 2006, p. 388). Eliminationism comes first; colonial warfare comes after elimination as the operational instrument of the structure; classical counter-insurgency comes after that, as the administrative and doctrinal refinement of an older colonial way of war. **Permanent security** is therefore not an aberration of settler colonialism but its logical culmination.

The term "permanent security" is not a journalistic coinage. It was given analytical content by the historian A. Dirk MOSES in *The Problems of Genocide* (2021), and its provenance is deliberately disturbing. MOSES adapted the phrase from the testimony of Otto OHLENDORF, the SS Einsatzgruppe commander tried at Nuremberg, whose unit murdered some 90,000 Jews. Asked why his men shot Jewish children, OHLENDORF explained that the children would otherwise grow up to avenge their parents; the Germans, he said, did not seek ordinary security but permanent security, because they were building a thousand-year Reich (MOSES, 2021, n.p.; *Review of Democracy*, 2021, n.p.). MOSES's point in recovering this genealogy is not to equate all subsequent users of the logic with Nazism, but to isolate a recurrent political rationality: the justification of mass civilian destruction as anticipatory self-defence against an imagined future threat. MOSES's larger argument is that the legal concept of genocide, as codified after 1948, was deliberately depoliticised by states wishing to retain freedom of action to suppress internal rebellion or wage war against perceived security threats (MOSES, 2021). By narrowing genocide to the destruction of racial or national groups, the drafters left a vast field of security-justified civilian destruction outside the "crime of crimes." Permanent security names precisely that field. Crucially for the present argument, MOSES situates this rationality within the history of colonial violence, reading much colonial mass violence as a form of "extreme counterinsurgency" (MOSES, 2021). This is the hinge that connects the concept to the genealogy of counter-insurgency doctrine.

Two features of **permanent security** do the analytical work. **First**, it is eliminationist. Its object is not only the defeat of an armed enemy but the removal of a population's capacity to regenerate threat: to make the state permanently safe and secure by removing — literally “rooting out” — the perceived native threat now and in the future. **Second**, it is futurist. It acts against a danger that has not yet materialised and justifies present destruction by reference to an imagined future attack. It is the conjunction of these two features — the elimination of a future — that distinguishes **permanent security** from ordinary self-defence.

The **colonial way of warfare** that operationalised this eliminationist logic had a recognisable grammar: scorched earth, starvation as a method, punitive expeditions, hostage-taking, forced concentration, collective punishment, village burning, crop and livestock destruction, and the deliberate destruction of social infrastructure. C. E. CALLWELL's *Small Wars* codified imperial operations against societies rather than armies, treating the destruction of subsistence and social infrastructure as a characteristic instrument of colonial campaigning (CALLWELL, 1906). Tom MENGER's comparative study of British, German and Dutch colonial warfare frames this grammar as a shared, transimperial phenomenon rather than a set of national peculiarities:

“The argument of this book, therefore, is, first, that we need to move away for good from the prevalent national exceptionalisms; and, second, that we need to do so within an explicitly transimperial framework. If we are to understand why levels of violence were extraordinarily high in all Western empires, the many theories about national ‘ways of war’ would seem to be the wrong place to look. In their place, this study posits a colonial way of war that was marked, across the different empires and both in theory and practice, more by commonality than divergence. This concept encompasses two main arguments: first, it positions extreme violence as an inherent part of this way of war, and thus a shared phenomenon among all Western colonial powers independently of national particularities; second, it holds that colonial ideology and racialised ideas explain an important part of this extreme violence.”

— Tom MENGER, *The Colonial Way of War: Violence and Colonial Warfare in the British, German and Dutch Empires, c.1890-1914* (Cambridge Military Histories) (MENGER, 2024).

Isabel HULL's *Absolute Destruction* shows how this grammar could escalate to annihilatory logic in German South West Africa, where the campaign against the

Herero and Nama moved from punitive operations to the denial of water, food and refuge until destruction became the operational objective itself (HULL, 2005). The Boer republics' experience under British scorched-earth doctrine — farm burnings, livestock destruction and the concentration-camp system — belongs to the same grammar. Starvation, collective punishment and the destruction of the social environment are therefore not aberrations of colonial warfare; they are part of its inherent grammar.

Only on this foundation does the classical counter-insurgency tradition make sense. COIN is not the origin of permanent security; it is the bureaucratized and doctrinal refinement of an older colonial way of war. Roger TRINQUIER wrote the classic manual of colonial counter-insurgency warfare, *La Guerre moderne* (1961), translated as *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (1964). David GALULA then systematized the doctrine in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), while his RAND study *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958* (1963) supplied the empirical Algerian case behind the theory. The British colonial tradition developed in parallel through the Malayan Emergency, where Robert THOMPSON distilled the administrative, intelligence, policing, population-control and “hearts and minds” logic of British counter-insurgency in *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966), and Frank KITSON extended it in *Low Intensity Operations* (1971).

Laleh KHALILI's study of confinement in counter-insurgencies shows the continuity across these traditions: population control, mass detention, spatial engineering and the management of the social environment recur whenever a state confronts a population it cannot assimilate and will not leave (KHALILI, 2013). The post-9/11 doctrinal revival in the United States, codified in FM 3-24 (2006) and theorized by NAGL (2002) and KILCULLEN (2009), carried the same DNA into the Global War on Terror, where “draining the sea” and “protecting the population” could slide into the management, punishment and reorganization of whole societies.

Israel's post-7 October doctrine sits at the end of this line and marks a decisive shift away from the founding security conception associated with David BEN-GURION.¹ The Ben-Gurion doctrine assumed a small state that could not impose permanent outcomes on its region and therefore rested on deterrence, early warning, rapid mobilisation and the decisive short war. The new posture abandons that premise for one of permanent regional enforcement. It therefore generates a contradiction between inward crisis and outward over-extension: the more the state seeks to solve its legitimacy problem externally, the more it militarises the environment that feeds back into its internal crisis.

The IDF's own writing makes the doctrinal inheritance visible. PACTH and HIMINIS, writing in the Dado Center, describe an explicit doctrinal shift from a small defensive force preserving the status quo to a regional protective force operating under what they call "enforcement and coercion" (akhifa ve-kfiya). Israeli military power, on this reading, must move "from a local defensive force protecting the borders of the state to a regional protective force" capable of "shaping a new regional order" through "operational control even in areas far from Israel's borders, without occupying and holding territory" (PACTH and HIMINIS, 2026). The Dado authors argue that the post-7 October environment requires an Israeli military posture that "prevents the emergence of any actor or axis with military power approaching that of Israel" and that "denies nuclear or WMD capability to any Middle Eastern state" (PACTH and HIMINIS, 2026). This is precisely permanent security in operational form: deterrence, containment and "mowing the grass" give way to prevention, enforcement, buffer zones, regional freedom of action and the redesign of the order itself. The Dado paper is the most explicit doctrinal articulation of the new posture and should be read as the authoritative internal expression of the shift.

¹ David BEN-GURION was born David Grün in Plonsk, then in the Russian Empire. He adopted the Hebrew surname Ben-Gurion after his immigration to Ottoman Palestine.

3. The ideological fuel: Christian Zionism and white nationalism

Permanent security is a security rationality, but it does not travel alone. In its present Anglo-American carrier it is fused with two overlapping ideological currents: Christian Zionism and a broader white/Christian nationalism animated by anxieties about demographic change in the United States and United Kingdom. The clearest recent emblem is Mike HUCKABEE, an ordained minister appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Israel. In a widely circulated interview with Tucker CARLSON, HUCKABEE was asked whether Israel should hold the biblical land from the Nile to the Euphrates. He replied that “it would be fine if they took it all” (CARLSON, 2026).

The significance of the episode lies less in the sentence than in the absence of consequence. A serving U.S. ambassador endorsed a maximalist territorial imaginary, drew condemnation from allied governments, and remained in office. This is not best understood as a conspiracy but as institutional sedimentation: a theological vocabulary — covenant, prophecy, Judea and Samaria, blessing and curse — has become so deeply embedded in parts of the U.S. political field that positions once requiring justification now circulate as common sense. The genealogy runs through British restorationism, dispensationalism, DARBY, SCOFIELD, LINDSEY, FALWELL, HAGEE and the institutional politics of Christians United for Israel.

This demographic anxiety has a deep colonial pedigree. As MENGER shows, the racialised fear and panic that drove colonial atrocity were rarely expressions of confident strength; they were symptoms of perceived vulnerability, projected outward onto a racial Other whose very presence was construed as threat:

“‘Cultural warfare’ generally also found expression in the ‘spectacular atrocities’ that accompanied most colonial wars and were so clearly predicated on racial alterity. In Aceh, for instance, many in the colonial army believed that decapitating killed Acehnese had a particularly deterrent effect, as it would supposedly deny Muslims entry into heaven. Other recurring atrocities of this type included the mutilation of enemy bodies, the public display or parading of severed body parts, or blithe posing next to the piles of bodies resulting from colonial massacres. (Cultural warfare was, however, not the only rationale for collecting body parts; it was, for instance, also pursued by Western scientists for the sake of an emerging ‘racial science’.) Atrocities of this sort, though not foremost in this book, are another central characteristic that

distinguishes colonial violence, as several scholars have shown. The desecration of the body of the racial Other, whether dead or alive, reflects with particular severity a view of the opponent as less than human, as an object of contempt and racial hatred. A second influence on my analysis is the recent scholarship on 'empire and anxiety', which has demonstrated the extent to which the agents of empire were moved by feelings of anxiety, fear and panic. Contrary to common assumptions that empires represent power and domination, and to the very real fact that empires were generally capable of hitting out with massive force when in crisis, these studies point out that the imperial actors themselves frequently felt vulnerable and weak. As I will show, many of the 'basic imperatives' I identify rest on these sensations and on the strategies adopted to camouflage them."

— Tom MENDER, *The Colonial Way of War: Violence and Colonial Warfare in the British, German and Dutch Empires, c.1890–1914* (Cambridge Military Histories) (MENDER, 2024).

Yet the episode also exposed strain inside the American right. The Christian nationalism increasingly represented by CARLSON asserts the priority of American interests over transnational theological commitments and asks why U.S. foreign policy should underwrite Israeli territorial ambition at the expense of other U.S. relationships. That strain is not merely rhetorical. Reporting that the Pentagon raised its assessment of the threat from Israeli espionage in the United States to its highest level points to a security relationship that carries real friction beneath the ideological alignment (NBC NEWS, 2025/2026). Christian Zionism organises itself around a prophetic programme; Christian nationalism organises itself around national sovereignty; the two no longer align seamlessly.

For the purposes of this paper, what unites these currents is a structure of thought that licenses neo-colonial practice. Demographic anxiety in the metropole and eliminationist security abroad are expressions of the same disposition: the treatment of a population's very presence as a threat to be managed, contained or removed. This is why the Israeli case has become so central to the contemporary language of decolonisation. The argument advanced here is not that every supporter of Israel shares this ideological structure, but that the fusion of permanent security, Christian Zionism and white/Christian nationalism makes colonial rationality speakable again in the metropole.

4. The hexagon: geo-economics, ISWR dominance and Africa's eastern rimland

If **permanent security** is the internal logic, the **hexagon** is its external projection — and the term is NETANYAHU's own.² The direct source is his opening statement to the Israeli cabinet on 22 February 2026, where he spoke of creating “a kind of hexagon of alliances around or within the Middle East” and listed India, Arab states, African states, Mediterranean states such as Greece and Cyprus, and Asian states (NETANYAHU, 2026). The ICGS analysis is crucial because it does not treat this as a loose metaphor. The ICGS states that the strategy rests on five geographic axes, with Israel “serving as a kind of hub, or effectively the sixth axis”; the Israeli axis connects Asia, Africa and Europe (ICGS, 2026). It also states that the vision seeks to shift from diplomatic arrangements and bilateral deterrence toward a multidimensional structure integrating “security coordination, infrastructural connectivity, and geo-economic cooperation” (ICGS, 2026).

The most explicit analysis is by Kobi MICHAEL through the ICGS. MICHAEL's formulation is exceptionally direct and warrants extended quotation. The ICGS, distilling MICHAEL's strategic reading, states that NETANYAHU's vision “does not seek to turn Israel into just another regional actor, but into a nexus connecting systems, continents, and interests” (ICGS, 2026). It elaborates: “the India–Greece–Cyprus axis enables Israel to position itself as a connector between systems and not merely between neighbours”, and that “the strategic objective is not regional integration in the European sense, but the construction of a multidimensional Israeli centrality — military, technological, infrastructural and diplomatic” (ICGS, 2026). This is why Kobi MICHAEL matters so much in the analysis: he supplies the strategic grammar that makes the hexagon more than rhetoric. It is, in his terms, an architecture of centrality.

The order of reading is therefore important. The primary materials are NETANYAHU's cabinet statement, the ICGS analysis, Kobi MICHAEL's strategic reading and the Dado Center's military-doctrinal work. LEVY comes after these sources because he interprets and synthesises them for an English readership. His

² He was born in Tel Aviv in 1949 as Binyamin Netanyahu / Benjamin Netanyahu. His father was Benzion Netanyahu, who had been born Benzion Mileikowsky in Warsaw, Poland. The family name Mileikowsky was Hebraicised to Netanyahu by the earlier generation after the family moved to Mandatory Palestine. In the United States, while studying and working there, he changed his name to Benjamin “Ben” Nitay or Ben Nitay. The New Yorker reports that in 1973 he shortened/changed his name to Ben Nitay, and that Israeli reporting later found legal documents for the change filed in Middlesex County, Massachusetts. In Israel, he reverted to and has been publicly known as Binyamin Netanyahu / Benjamin Netanyahu.

contribution is to name the political form of the architecture: “dominion”. But the domination logic is already explicit in the Hebrew and official-adjacent sources themselves.

On this reading, the hexagon has four layers:

- **Diplomatic layer** — the network of alliances linking India, Arab states, African states, Greece, Cyprus and Asian partners.
- **Geo-economic layer** — Israel as a hub for infrastructure, energy routes, trade corridors, ports, military technology, AI and cyber cooperation linking Asia, the Gulf, Africa and Europe. IMEC, Haifa and the Red Sea littoral are the physical anchors.
- **Coercive-security layer** — the military freedom to enforce outcomes against Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas, the Houthis and any future “radical” axis, including an explicitly named concern with Turkey and political Islam.
- **Surveillance and ISWR domination layer** — Israel uses a combination of satellite, cyber, electromagnetic and human surveillance as an integrated intelligence, surveillance, warfare and reconnaissance (ISWR) system. This is supported by dedicated capabilities and specialist units in the IDF and intelligence cluster engaging in narrative warfighting, cognitive campaigns, public-opinion manipulation, societal friction and destabilisation, and electoral interference.

The fourth layer is not supplementary; it is constitutive. A regional hub cannot function only through bases, ports and corridors. It requires continuous mapping of adversaries, partners, publics, platforms, financial flows, diaspora networks and political cleavages. PE'ERY's reporting on a leaked Israeli Defense Ministry tender for training soldiers and foreign partners in operations to influence public consciousness is therefore not incidental: it points to an apparatus in which perception management, influence operations and political engineering are integrated into the military-security project (PE'ERY, 2026).

The Dado Center gives the deeper military translation, and the language deserves quotation in full. PACT and HIMINIS argue that Israeli military power must become a regional ordering capacity, not merely a border-defence instrument. In their words, the stated goals include “preventing any actor or axis from acquiring military power greater than Israel's; preventing nuclear or WMD capability anywhere in the Middle East; enforcing security margins around Gaza, southern Lebanon, southern Syria, Sinai and Jordan; containing Turkey; preventing enemy

entrenchment in neighbouring states; and preserving freedom of movement and trade across the region” (PACHT and HIMINIS, 2026). This is not normal border defence. It is a doctrine of regional military management. The nuclear and WMD clause is especially revealing because it asserts a permanent Israeli monopoly on the most consequential military capability in the region, to be enforced pre-emptively.

Africa’s eastern rimland enters here decisively. The Red Sea, the Horn, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somaliland and the corridor running from Haifa through the Arabian Peninsula to the Indian Ocean are not incidental to the hexagon. They are the contested node through which corridors, ports, data infrastructure, energy and security cooperation must pass. The ICGS explicitly locates Israel at the centre of Asia, Africa and Europe. The JCFA’s six-member configuration — Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus, Ethiopia and the UAE — frames the design as a defensive arc against radical axes (JCFA, 2026). In practice, that formulation places Ethiopia and the Red Sea littoral at the heart of the project.

African Eastern Rim

Andre ZAAIMAN - 2013




Figure 1: The African Eastern Rim (Andre ZAAIMAN, 2013).

The inclusion of Ethiopia, and the centrality of Red Sea port politics, sharpens around the Somaliland question. Somaliland's search for international recognition, its strategic position opposite Yemen and adjacent to Bab al-Mandab, and its Berbera port infrastructure have made it the subject of intensifying regional manoeuvring. Reports of Israeli interest in Somaliland — including proposed or speculated security cooperation, intelligence partnership, and the possibility of a military or naval basing arrangement, often discussed in tandem with Emirati involvement in Berbera — have produced a serious diplomatic controversy. Hargeisa's overtures toward Israel, real or perceived, have drawn sharp reactions from Mogadishu, the African Union, the Arab League and Red Sea littoral states, and have linked the Somaliland question directly to the Israeli repositioning project. Any Israeli or joint Israeli-UAE security footprint in Somaliland would not be a local Horn of Africa issue. It would insert the Somali theatre into a broader architecture linking the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean. That has direct implications for Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia; it also has implications for South Africa, which has a significant Somali refugee and expatriate network whose political, familial and commercial ties remain connected to the Horn.

The precise formulation is therefore this: NETANYAHU's hexagon is the external-regional version of Greater Israel, not by annexing the whole region but by positioning Israel as the dominant if not compulsory hub through which regional security, corridors, trade, energy, ports, surveillance and military technology must pass. The strongest accurate wording is regional hegemony or dominion, not crude formal annexation.

5. The apartheid comparison: from outward policy to permanent security — and failure

It is obvious that NETANYAHU is driving an ambitious expansionist vision of Israeli national security through regional coercion and domination. The question this poses is whether the move comes from a position of strength or from one of weakness. The South African historical analogy — despite its differences — may prove useful and instructive. Regimes moving towards a full-blown regime crisis often try to expand and escalate themselves away from it. The manoeuvre serves to consolidate waning domestic and international support and legitimacy by manufacturing external successes that compensate for internal exhaustion. The failed and humiliating German bid at the UN Security Council is a clear sign of waning support: unqualified German backing for the Israeli genocide in Gaza and for the wars of aggression in Iran, Syria and Lebanon has cost Germany dearly. This ambitious security initiative, driven by a delusional prime minister repeatedly warned by his own generals that the IDF is overstretched and heading for its own crisis, may prove to be the straw that precipitates a sudden acceleration of the internal dynamic towards decomposition. Moreover — as the South African analogy demonstrates — expansionist regional projects of this kind have historically united the region against the apartheid regime, despite “tactical successes” such as the Nkomati Accord (the apartheid South Africa version of the apartheid Israel Abraham Accords), and have hastened isolation and decline.

The comparison is structural, not identitarian. Both South Africa and Israel were/are settler-colonial states confronting political contradictions they could not/cannot resolve internally. Both use fragmentation, divide-and-rule, legal differentiation, economic diplomacy and security dependency. Both attempt to convert a coercive domination structure into a regional security project. The analogy illuminates the trajectory, including its destination.

The South African genealogy runs in distinct phases. Hendrik VERWOERD imagined a white-centred regional economic order. B. J. VORSTER made the idea operational through outward policy and détente: a bid to break isolation by drawing small, dependent states such as Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi into a Pretoria-centred orbit through trade, transport, labour markets and intelligence ties. This was not an alliance of equals but a buffer-and-dependency architecture. VORSTER then globalised the logic into a network of isolated anti-communist states — Israel, Chile, Taiwan, Paraguay and Uruguay — together

with the maritime-security imaginary of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. VORSTER's 1976 visit to Jerusalem and the cooperation that followed made Israel one of Pretoria's most important partners.

P. W. BOTHA inherited this architecture and changed its operating logic. Under the rubric of a Constellation of Southern African States, the diplomatic constellation was absorbed into Total Strategy and Total War. The region became a battlespace. The SADF, police and intelligence system sought not merely to deter enemies but to destroy the regional conditions from which the ANC, SWAPO and revolutionary capacity could regenerate. This was apartheid South Africa's own version of permanent security: cross-border raids, proxy destabilisation, coercive diplomacy and the militarisation of neighbouring societies. It targeted the future capacity of liberation movements, not merely their present armed formations.

The structural rhyme with the Israeli sequence can be stated directly:

- **Internal order:** apartheid rule in South Africa; occupation and an apartheid form of rule over Palestinians.
- **Buffer architecture:** homelands and dependent neighbours; Gaza, West Bank fragmentation, security zones and border regimes.
- **Outward phase:** VORSTER's détente and constellation; NETANYAHU's hexagon and normalisation architecture.
- **Pariah/hub partners:** Israel, Taiwan, Chile and the SATO imaginary; India, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, Ethiopia and Mediterranean/Red Sea axes.
- **Militarised turn:** Total Strategy and Total War; permanent security and multi-front war.
- **Counter-insurgency target:** the ANC, SWAPO and the Frontline States; Hamas, Hizbullah and Iran-linked networks.

The point is that both South Africa and Israel were/are settler-colonial states organised through an institutionalised structure of domination; both tried/try to use fragmentation, divide-and-rule and economic diplomacy; both aimed/aim to convert a coercive domination structure into a regional security project; and the analogy illuminates the trajectory — including its destination.

The South African constellation collapsed because the contradiction at its core was too large for any regional architecture to contain. VORSTER wanted African states to accept regional cooperation while apartheid remained intact. The OAU, the Frontline States and the liberation movements saw apartheid itself as the problem

and rejected détente. Portugal's empire fell in 1974; Mozambique and Angola became independent; the 1975 invasion of Angola and the 1976 Soweto uprising hardened the regional front; sanctions, military overreach and economic crisis did the rest. BOTHA's permanent-security turn did not save the project. It accelerated the collapse by converting potential interlocutors into permanent enemies and by exhausting the state that pursued it.

The implication for the Israeli hexagon is cautionary rather than predictive. A regional order built on the permanent insecurity of its neighbours and on the indefinite management of a dominated population may purchase short-term centrality at the cost of long-term legitimacy. The apartheid state made itself indispensable to its region's economy and feared by its neighbours, and still could not outrun the contradiction that the structure of domination generated. Whether the hexagon proves more durable depends on whether Israel can do what apartheid South Africa could not: resolve, rather than merely externalise, the contradiction at its core until it is too late. "Permanent security", by its nature, defers that resolution indefinitely — which is precisely why, on the evidence of the South African case, it tends not to produce permanence at all.

In the end, apartheid could not be sustained in South Africa, and the regime — despite its nuclear weapons and its impressive military superiority until the successful Angolan-Cuban pushback at Cuito Cuanavale — had to abandon both its unjust ideological project and its expansive regional security ambitions, as the rest of the world turned on what remained of its international legitimacy, already in tatters.

Apartheid Israel has now drifted into a similar logic of over-ambition, over-extension and capability-legitimacy mismatch that can no longer hide the full-blown regime crisis in the making. All revolutionary situations must first ripen, and so does every regime decomposition: the signals in apartheid Israel are flashing amber...

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Source note: This refined draft draws on the supplied project-file text and refinement memorandum. Where Hebrew-language sources are cited through English analysis or project notes, the wording should be checked against the original Hebrew before formal publication. No source, quotation or author has been intentionally fabricated.