On Deliberation: (epistemic)justice and (press)freedom in South Africa in word and deed

©Andre ZAAIMAN

The rancid and acrimonious public exchanges peppered with strong racial and gender undertones that mark what goes for public debate in South Africa, raises a question that may at first glance, seem preposterous: are we sliding into a form of “civil war by other means”?

Words, information and knowledge can easily become dangerous weapons of a different kind.

Although deliberation – a free and critical public dialogue – is an essential feature of a stable and robust democracy, it is by no means certain that its citizens will know how to engage in this civic art. Besides, freedom of speech and expression as civil liberties are necessary but not sufficient conditions for this (that is inclusive, deliberative and equitable democracy) to happen: amongst many other things the citizenry has to be capable and the body politic free too.

But what does this freedom mean?

Certainly it means different things to different people and like all concepts, the dominant meanings ascribed to it have evolved and changed over time. In his 1997 Inaugural Lecture in Modern History at the University of Cambridge – later published as a book entitled Liberty before Liberalism (1998) – Professor Quentin Skinner skillfully traces the rise and fall within Anglophone political theory of what he labels “a neo-roman or republican understanding of civil liberty”. He describes how the “neo-roman theory rose to prominence in the course of the English revolution of the mid-17th century…but the ideological triumph of liberalism left the neo-roman theory largely discredited…the rival view of liberty embedded in classical liberalism went on to attain a predominance in Anglophone political philosophy which it has never subsequently relinquished.”

In the neo-roman conception of freedom, civil liberty was not defined by civil society or non-interference, but instead, by not being in servitude. In other words not being ‘in potestate‘ or literally ‘in the power of someone else’ as for example in the case of slavery; or something else as for example in the case of colonialism. The patronizing, patriarchal and paternalistic idea of “the good Master” is therefore anathema to the republican notion of freedom as non-domination.

Importantly, this is not necessarily the case in the classic liberal motion of freedom as non-interference.

In his 2014 book ‘Just Freedom: a moral compass for a complex world’, the political theorist Philip Pettit argues that “freedom in this sense requires the absence not just of interference, but of the subjection to another that was known at the time of the Roman republic as dominatio or domination”. He goes on to explain that “a common metaphor suggests that you are free insofar as you are given free rein in your choices. If you have all the leeway or latitude you could wish for, if you enjoy carte blanche in determining how to act, then by this suggestion you enjoy freedom in the fullest measure. The phrase ‘free rein’ is drawn from horse-riding. When a rider lets the reins hang loose, the horse enjoys free rein: it can go in whatever direction it wishes. When you are given free rein, so the metaphor suggests, you too can take whatever path you choose: you are under no one else’s operative control. But while giving the horse its head in this sense, I remain in the saddle…I do not exercise operative control over the horse, then, but I do enjoy potential or reserve control. And as that holds in the literal case, so it holds also in the metaphorical. When I give you free rein, I refrain from exercising operative control, but I still enjoy the reserve counterpart of that control. I may not pull on the reins but I do remain in the saddle.”

According to Pettit, a “republic, as it came to be conceptualized, is nothing more and nothing less than a community organized around these ideas of equality before and equality over the law. By a curious irony, however, it was at this very time that another way of thinking about freedom emerged to displace republican ideas. Under this conception, freedom in any choice requires just the absence of restriction or interference, not the absence of domination. One can enjoy freedom, in other words, just by enjoying free rein; it does not matter that another party sits in the saddle, retaining reserve control over how you choose”

This conceptual contestation is crucial to understand in our current debates, disagreements and firefights about transformation – in particular transformation in and of the media – towards a society in South Africa that is both free and just. It also raises the real question: what are the subtle and not-so-subtle residual forms of domination – of un-freedom – in the infosphere and beyond, that still plague our stuttering journey towards a fuller democracy?

And perhaps it explains the bitter tones between former comrades and across racial divides in our public discourse: the intuitive and tacit use of entirely different conceptions of freedom and what it means?

Albert O Hirschman in his wonderful 1991 Essay entitled “The Rhetoric of Reaction: perversity, futility, jeopardy” argued that “a democratic regime achieves legitimacy to the extent that its decisions result from full and open deliberation among its principal groups, bodies, and representatives. Deliberation is here conceived as an opinion-forming process: the participants should not have fully or definitively formed opinions at the outset; they are expected to engage in meaningful discussion, which means that they should be ready to modify initially held opinions in the light of arguments of other participants and also as a result of new information which becomes available in the course of the debate”.

But he hastened to point out that to achieve this informed, self-critical and free opinion-forming, deliberative process, is far easier said than done for there are several obstacles and dilemmas that stand in its way. These obstacles require further scrutiny and we will briefly look at three: 1) contextual dilemmas; 2) rhetorics of intransigence; and 3) epistemic injustice.

The first difficulty arises from the context because most modern democracies empirically-speaking, come into being not as a result of a pre-existing consensus on shared or basic values “but rather because various groups that had been at each other’s throats for a prolonged period had to recognize their mutual inability to achieve dominance. Tolerance and acceptance of pluralism resulted eventually from a standoff between bitterly hostile opposing groups.” (Hirschman 1991).

One will be forgiven for thinking that Hirschman had South Africa in his mind when he wrote this, for in trying to understand this as well as his later descriptions of the nature and the rise of conservative, neo-conservative and reactionary politics that flows from such standoffs and subsequent transitions, one cannot but notice the relevance of this and of what he observes next:

“A people that only yesterday was engaged in fratricidal struggles is not likely to settle down overnight to those constructive give-and-take deliberations. Far more likely, there will initially be agreement to disagree, but without any attempt at melding the opposing points of view— that is indeed the nature of religious tolerance. Or, if there is discussion, it will be a typical “dialogue of the deaf”— a dialogue that will in fact long function as a prolongation of, and a substitute for, civil war. Even in the most “advanced” democracies, many debates are, to paraphrase Clausewitz, a “continuation of civil war with other means.” Such debates, with each party on the lookout for arguments that kill, are only too familiar from democratic politics as usual. There remains then a long and difficult road to be traveled from the traditional internecine, intransigent discourse to a more “democracy-friendly” kind of dialogue. For those wishing to undertake this expedition there should be value in knowing about a few danger signals, such as arguments that are in effect contraptions specifically designed to make dialogue and deliberation impossible.”

Secondly, these arguments, contraptions and rhetorics of intransigence that block social change – transformation in South African parlance – and make sound deliberation impossible, can be defined, according to Hirschman (1991), as three reactionary narratives: 1) the perversity narrative in which policies or actions intended to effect socio-political and economic change are portrayed as having the opposite effect; 2) the futility narrative in which all attempts at transformation are portrayed as likely to fail creating a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and negative-expectancy behavior; and 3) a jeopardy narrative in which the costs of transformation are portrayed as too high and as endangering some previously achieved accomplishment.

But if we need to broaden our conception of freedom, then what about our conception of justice? For a lot has recently been said about freedom but much less – if anything – about justice. From Charlie Hebdos insistence on its supposed freedom and right to publish offensive religious symbols – even in the face of vociferous protestations – to debates about press freedom in South Africa and the right of journalists to express their political views freely albeit in a playful, social manner.

What is ignored is often more telling than what is said.

This point was not lost on African political observers, many of whom have remarked on the disproportionate media coverage given to violent events in Paris relative to similar violent events – but with much higher casualty rates – at roughly the same time in Nigeria; all perpetrated in the name of one or the other religion as such atrocities often are.

What then politically-speaking, is at play here? For this discursive game is not at all innocent but reflects quite vividly the underlying power relations in our society battling to transform itself away from an unjust to a just society: away from the evils of the past: discrimination, exclusion, violence, paternalism, patriarchy, inequality, dispossession and domination. In this sense, our democratic Constitution, based on the Freedom Charter and the wide consensus of our society, not only embodies what we mean by a “free and just society” but also calls upon all citizens to actively and practically transform our lives individually and collectively in this ongoing process.

Freedom must not come at the expense of justice.

The philosopher Amartaya SEN in his book “The Idea of Justice” argues that “We may often enough agree that some changes contemplated – like the abolition of apartheid, to give an example of a different kind – will reduce injustice, but even if all such agreed changes are successfully implemented, we will not have anything that we can call perfect justice. Practical concerns, no less than theoretical reasoning, seem to demand a fairly radical departure in the analysis of justice.” This call for a critical analysis of justice; and implicitly of freedom and of the relation between these two concepts, brings us to the third and last obstacle towards an inclusive and deliberative democracy: epistemic injustice.

What does epistemic justice entail? According to Free State University academic Tania Rauch-Van der Merwe in her provocative and insightful new study entitled “The political construction of occupational therapy: A critical discourse analysis of curriculum as discourse” and drawing on the work of Miranda Fricker, Nancy Fraser and Michel Foucault, epistemic injustice entails the unexamined a-priori assumption – often imbedded within discreet discourses of superiority and domination – that some groups of people such as women or blacks (or the poor or African?) are illegitimate or less-legitimate “bearers of truths” (Rauch-Van der Merwe) or “carriers of knowledge” (Fricker).

It’s importance derives from the simple fact that in a deliberative democracy where diverse opinions, the inclusion of marginal or excluded voices, and non-paternalistic modes of communication are critical transformative acts, epistemic injustices remain a major if hidden obstacle to making progress away from societal injustice and towards an undoing of forms of discursive domination that curtails freedom and negatively impacts on the potential for greater justice.

My contention is that such forms of epistemic injustices – a residual form of domination and therefore of un-freedom – are widespread in the South African media, public discourses and knowledge work. The opinions of white or male intellectuals and journalists in public debates frequently carry more weight than those of black or female intellectuals. If we want to move towards greater social cohesion and a society that is both free and just, then creating space for more rational, sober, inclusive and self-critical public debate, must become a priority. A free press and the media must play a central role in doing so but it will require that we all as citizens and as a society, honestly address the pernicious obstacles to real democratic deliberation and transformation that face us: the contextual dilemmas of our violent and divisive past; the rhetorics of intransigence to transform it; and the unfreedom that derives from pervasive and ongoing epistemic injustice.

But first, what masquerades as public debates or deliberation must cease to be conducted as though they are the continuation of civil strife and war by other means; we are equal citizens and not enemies after-all.

NATIONAL SECURITY : China-US-Africa

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NATIONAL SECURITY: navigating the coming rough seas between the USA and China

Part 1: America

©Andre ZAAIMAN

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.” Clausewitz

Will China and America cooperate, compete or go to war?

The emerging geo-political great game between the USA and China is of great importance to Africa and South Africa. How this great power relationship unfolds will have a commanding influence on the 21st century. As it intensifies, it will remind us that ideology, politics, strategy, money and geography matter; that history has not ended.

The South African Government will have to ensure that South African foreign, security and intelligence policy and strategy consider these developments continuously as they unfold. The recently released Defense Review is therefore significant and timely…

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Pondering Points: Additional Notes to the Geo-Strategic Significance of Gaza ©Andre ZAAIMAN 2014

Pondering Points: Additional Notes to the Geo-Strategic Significance of Gaza
©Andre ZAAIMAN 2014

“The cardinal maxim of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”
Henry KISSINGER

As the political-military situation in Gaza as part of Operation Protective Edge comes to an end – for now – with the announcement of the acceptance of a long-term ceasefire by Israel and the Palestinians, we can begin to make preliminary notes on what has happened, what has been said and where all of this is likely to lead to. The details of the cease-fire are not yet publicly available but will be revealed in the coming days and weeks, which will allow for a sober and informed assessment.

And as claims and counter-claims of victory and defeat are made in these early stages, I am reminded – but not for the reasons that many may assume – of the article by Gideon LEVY in the Israeli newspaper Haaertz in January 2011 under the title: “The IDF uses propaganda like an authoritarian regime”. LEVY is a fiercely independent and outspoken critic of the policies and behavior of his fellow citizens and of his Government. Writing about another issue, he says the following:

“Instead of working toward revealing the truth behind the recent death of an anti-fence demonstrator the IDF is reaching into its bag of lies. Jawaher Abu Ramah died young. She stood facing the demonstrators against the separation fence in her village, inhaled very large quantities of the gas that Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired that day, collapsed and died several hours later at a Ramallah hospital.These are definitive facts. The IDF should have immediately issued a statement expressing sorrow for the death of the demonstrator, and said it would investigate the excessive means used for dispersing demonstrations at Bil’in, which had killed Bassem, Jawaher’s brother, for no reason. He was hit by a gas canister fired directly at his chest two and a half years ago. So, the IDF began with the spreading of lies, making up facts and spinning tales, originating with officers who did not dare identify themselves. Following the investigation into Jawaher’s death, it is also necessary to investigate how the army dares to distort in this way. Perhaps it will disturb Israeli society more than the death of a demonstrator.”

I do not use this quotation by Gideon LEVY to just remind the Readers that in war, all Armies and politicians tend to exaggerate, spin and even lie: hence that we ought to submit what the military on either side claims to rigorous factual scrutiny. It is rather to make the point that such practices take on a very different meaning and significance in the context of the kind of conflict the Israelis have chosen to engage the Palestinians in; and as a direct result of that, the equally important context of the struggle for national self-determination by the Palestinians.

Let me explain:

In our first piece on the Geo-Strategic significance of Gaza (see the Menu on your right hand side) the argument was made that:

“The current violent assault by Israel on a territory (Gaza) and a people (Palestinians) that it has displaced and occupies – and on Hamas in particular – has, at a tactical level, its domestic roots in the 2005 unilateral “withdrawal” of Israel from Gaza by the then Government of Ariel SHARON. It signaled the end of the “peace process”; which had already by then, following the 1995 murder of Yitzhak RABIN by a fellow Israeli Jew, started to morph away from a real peace process to a mere extension of war-by-other-means.”

Furthermore it was argued that one of the reasons why Israel initiated the conflict was to maintain the “division of the Palestinians, both geographically (physical) and organizationally (as a movement), in order to conquer the West Bank and make the establishment of a viable Palestinian State, impossible. This divide-and-rule method is as old as colonial conquest itself and is one of the reasons why Israeli historians such as Ilan PAPPE calls this ethnic cleansing. It is also why the recent rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas is one of the principal reasons why Israel decided to go after Hamas now: Israel wants the Palestinians to remain divided and fractured; and it wants Hamas (which analytically fits into the broader idea of Political Islam), to become depoliticized and disarmed.

According to Rashid KALIDI in his article “Gaza: Collective Punishment” of 29 July 2014, Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU, speaking in Hebrew [Israel frequently accuses the Palestinians of saying one thing in Arabic and another in English Ed], said the following:

“Three days after the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched the current war in Gaza, he held a press conference in Tel Aviv during which he said, in Hebrew, according to the Times of Israel, ‘I think the Israeli people understand now what I always say: that there cannot be a situation, under any agreement, in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the River Jordan.’ It’s worth listening carefully when Netanyahu speaks to the Israeli people. What is going on in Palestine today is not really about Hamas. It is not about rockets. It is not about “human shields” or terrorism or tunnels. It is about Israel’s permanent control over Palestinian land and Palestinian lives. That is what Netanyahu is really saying, and that is what he now admits he has “always” talked about. It is about an unswerving, decades-long Israeli policy of denying Palestine self-determination, freedom, and sovereignty.”

[On the 28th of August 2014 the PLO published the Report “Business as Usual” in which it documented these continued killings, land grabs, demolitions and arrests as Operation Protective Edge in Gaza was going on. Ed]

The PLO Report says: “The Israeli aggression against the Occupied Gaza Governorates ran in parallel with the Israeli oppression and colonization in the rest of the Occupied State of Palestine. Ongoing aggression continued throughout the period of intensive attacks against Gaza, including the advancement of settlements, home demolitions, movement restrictions, detentions and settler violence.Though Israeli spokespeople tried to present their attacks on Gaza as a particular action against Palestinian resistance groups, Israeli occupation and colonization policies all over the Occupied State of Palestine make it clear that the ultimate Israeli goal continues to be to prevent the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State. ”

When Ariel SHARON passed away, the renowned Israeli historian Avi SHLAIM wrote the following in Open Democracy on 14 January 2014: “Sharon was an aggressive expansionist. His main aim when he came to power in 2001 was to eliminate the two-state solution and to determine unilaterally the borders of Greater Israel. By the time he fell into a coma five years later, he had gone some way towards achieving this aim. His short-term success, however, gravely diminished the prospect of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. Sharon’s legacy is therefore as controversial as his life. Sharon had always been an ardent Jewish nationalist, a dyed-in-the-wool hardliner, and a ferocious right-wing hawk. He also displayed a consistent preference for force over diplomacy in dealing with the Arabs. Reversing Clausewitz’s famous dictum, he treated diplomacy as the extension of war by other means…As minister of defence Sharon led Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It was a war of deception that failed to achieve any of its grandiose geopolitical objectives. A commission of inquiry found Sharon responsible for failing to prevent the massacre by Christian Phalangists of Palestinian refugees in Beirut’s Sabra and Shatila camps. This verdict was etched on his forehead like a mark of Cain. But who foresaw that the man who was declared unfit to be minister of defence would bounce back as prime minister?..To the Palestinians Sharon represented the cold, cruel, militaristic face of the Zionist occupation.”

The revolt of the right wing Zionist camps of Prime Ministers SHARON, NETANYAHU and to a lessor extent that of Ehud OLMERT, against the left wing Mapai/Labour and Meretz parties’ approach of negotiations towards a two-state solution, had a three-fold aim: 1) to initially freeze the negotiations for a two-state solution through unilateral-disengagement 2) then to reverse the effects in the ground and re-establish Israeli military deterrence and domination through the isolation and siege of the PLO leader Yasser ARAFAT, assassinating the top Hamas leadership, withdrawing from Gaza in order to put it under siege – in the famous phrase “putting the Palestinians of Gaza on a diet” – and then 3) to reconfigure the Middle East region in a way that suited Israeli security and political needs. This included diminishing Israeli dependence on the USA at the appropriate moment, in order to give it a freer hand in aggressively reshaping the Middle East without American interference.

I will explore this in greater detail below but suffice to state at this stage that three key outcomes of Operation Protective Edge when viewed from the Israeli side are:

1. The rapid loss by Israel of the moral dimension in the conflict with the Palestinians of which the outrage of Gideon LEVY is a good example. This is what Prof. Naomi CHAZAN (Israel’s Other War: Moral Attrition in the Times of Israel: 25 August 2014) had to say:

“Israel is currently involved in two wars. The first, the external one, is immediate and inescapably consuming. The Gaza engagement has continued relentlessly for the bulk of the summer; it is being fought openly not only militarily, but also diplomatically and politically on the ground, in the media and in the international arena. The second, the internal one, is latent and mostly subsumed from the public eye. The war against the racism and intolerance which is festering rapidly below the surface in Israel only commands public attention sporadically — most recently around the marriage of Morel Malka and Mahmud Mansur — although this threat has grown by leaps and bounds as the Gaza operation has progressed. No concerted effort, however, is being made to fight the mortal dangers it poses. While Israel is struggling to defend itself against fundamentalist-fueled enmity from abroad, it is doing very little to safeguard itself from the fanaticism that is being bred in its own backyard.”

2. Neither the left nor the right wing traditions of political Zionism has succeeded in delivering to Israel its key national security objective: the submission of the Palestinian national movement by any means in order to lay claim to their land and eventually obtain recognition for the exclusivist, Jewish character of the State of Israel. In other words neither the left wing land-for-peace formula obtained through agreement, nor the militarist peace-for-peace formula based on unilateral Israeli moves, have worked
As a result of these dead ends and failed strategies, the international tide is turning against the Zionist project in its current form at an unprecedented speed and scale. Neither the Zionist left nor right seem capable of offering any realistic political way out of this quagmire other than more violence and coercion.

3. More importantly, Zionism itself will enter a profound internal crisis.

This is what Henry SIEGMAN said in a radio interview with Amy GOODMAN of Democracy Now! on the 14th of July 2014:
“The Zionist dream is based on the repeated slaughter of innocents on a scale that we’re watching these days on television, that is really a profound, profound crisis — and should be a profound crisis in the thinking of all of us who were committed to the establishment of the state and to its success”

That crisis will indeed be observed in the coming months and years.

Whilst ordinary Israelis watched helplessly as their once proud Army seemed incapable of providing complete security, defending them or deterring their adversaries, they were repeatedly told by an increasingly hollow-sounding and schoolmasterish Prime Minister NETANYAHU “that the Palestinians will pay a heavy price”. The Palestinians defiantly replied with more rockets. The temporary closing of Ben Gurion International Airport during this conflict, inflicted a severe psychological blow to Israeli citizens who suddenly realized that they too may become trapped in a siege. The nightmare of Israeli citizens – as was the case in all settler colonial projects whether for example in Algeria or South Africa – is that the capacity for violence, repression and coercion of its Army will not be enough to prevent those that are Occupied (Palestinians) from “doing onto others as was done onto them”. It is this nightmare that Gideon LEVY is trying to prevent and is warning other Israelis about. It is also why the 65 dead Israeli soldiers and the continued rocket fire during Operation Protective Edge, has made such a huge psychological impact.

In apartheid South Africa, this kind of end-game crisis was reached in 1979 when the then newly elected National Party Prime Minister P.W. BOTHA made a speech in which he declared to his White constituency: “Adapt or Die”. The Israeli equivalent of this is the dead end that Zionism finds itself in today. I do nonetheless want to caution against simplistic comparisons and analogous reasoning of contexts and situations that clearly have similarities but also important differences: each context and reality must be understood with its own facts. And neither should the Palestinians ignore the important warning of the victorious Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen GIAP who lead the campaign that ultimately defeated the United States in Vietnam, when he argued in “The Fundamental Problems of our War of Liberation” that:

“The Vietnamese peoples war of liberation had, therefore, to be a hard and long-lasting war in order to succeed in creating the conditions for victory. All the conceptions born of impatience and aimed at gaining speedy victory could only be gross errors”

Therefore, the crisis of Zionism will not mean that it is collapsing. But what I will argue is that it has entered a phase of decomposition which opens up the space and imperative for real political work to be done. This political work however must be done not only because the Palestinians have become the ascending party in the conflict, but also in order to prevent an irreversible catastrophe of the kind last seen during the Second World War. In other words the paradox is that the weaker but ascending party (the Palestinians) must begin to reflect on how they will address the deepest fears of the Jewish population in the region in order to prevent them from committing unspeakable crimes. For when regimes begin to decompose, it also creates conditions of fear that can easily lead to irrational decision-making and panic amongst those that previously believed -mistakenly – that their superior military force and coercive power made them invincible.

Both Hezbollah in 2006 and astonishingly Hamas in 2014 have vividly demonstrated to Israel the severe limitations of militarism; particularly when it is devoid of politics. These are historical lessons that all colonial powers have learned; and that the Americans have now learned twice in the past 120 years: in Vietnam and in Iraq.

In the same first piece (The Geo-Strategic significance of Gaza) we also noted some of cardinal weaknesses in the Israeli side such as the moral cancer that stems from practices such as dispossession, violence and occupation which are inherent in settler colonialism, as well as the state of hubris and denial that follows from the strong beliefs in its own rhetoric and fabrications that are necessarily required to sustain a political project of this nature. Once more, it is clear that people like Gideon LEVY and others – without sounding alarmist – are desperately trying to warn their society of an approaching catastrophe caused by the increasing loss of moral sensibility amongst war-weary Israelis and their successive adventurist Governments caught up in hubris, denialism and failed experiments.

Much however, is known about this and how such projects eventually decompose. One may mistakenly assume that only a few marginal Israelis have intuitively or through real experiences, grasped the nettle of the dilemma. But nothing could be further from the truth. Right wing Israeli leaders such as SHARON and OLMERT repeatedly warned Israelis that their country risk to degenerate into a situation of Algeria during the French colonial period or South Africa during the apartheid era. As we will demonstrate later in this article, even Benjamin NETANYAHU was driven by the realization that “something had to give”; that the status quo was becoming unsustainable.

The Palestinians; like the Vietnamese, Algerians or South Africans; have however begun to smell the decay and notice the signs of the disease that infects all projects of this nature.

And none other than Yitzak RABIN, the Israeli war hero, Labour Party Prime Minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner (with Yasser ARAFAT), had very clearly understood the danger for Israel if Zionism goes into a moral crisis because it had become over-dependent on militarism and violence to sustain itself. This was expressed in his moving words on the White House lawn in 1993: “Let me say to you, the Palestinians, we are destined to live together on the same soil in the same land. We, the soldiers who have returned from battles stained with blood; we who have seen our relatives and friends killed before our eyes; we who have attended their funerals and cannot look in the eyes of their parents; we who have come from a land where parents bury their children; we who have fought against you, the Palestinians—we say to you today, in a loud and clear voice: enough blood and tears. Enough. We have no desire for revenge. We harbor no hatred towards you. We, like you, are people—people who want to build a home. To plant a tree. To love—live side by side with you. In dignity. In empathy. As human beings. As free men. We are today giving peace a chance—and saying to you and saying again to you: enough. Let us pray that a day will come when we all will say farewell to the arms. We wish to open a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together—a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding. We hope to embark on a new era in the history of the Middle East. Today here in Washington at the White House, we will begin a new reckoning in the relations between peoples, between parents tired of war, between children who will not know war.”

Despite this promise, the Israeli left failed to deliver through negotiations, agreements and the land-for-peace formula. It was no coincidence therefore that the policy document entitled “A Clean Break: a new Strategy for the Defense of the Realm” that was prepared in 1996 by a study group led by Richard PERLE for Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU, started off with these words:

“Israel has a large problem. Labor Zionism, which for 70 years has dominated the Zionist movement, has generated a stalled and shackled economy. Efforts to salvage Israel’s socialist institutions—which include pursuing supranational over national sovereignty and pursuing a peace process that embraces the slogan, “New Middle East”—undermine the legitimacy of the nation and lead Israel into strategic paralysis and the previous government’s “peace process.” That peace process obscured the evidence of eroding national critical mass— including a palpable sense of national exhaustion—and forfeited strategic initiative…Benjamin Netanyahu’s government comes in with a new set of ideas. While there are those who will counsel continuity, Israel has the opportunity to make a clean break; it can forge a peace process and strategy based on an entirely new intellectual foundation, one that restores strategic initiative and provides the nation the room to engage every possible energy on rebuilding Zionism, the starting point of which must be economic reform.”

Subsequently Ariel SHARON once he became Minister, used the “clean break” of NETANYAHU to begin to reverse the “damage” wrought by the Labour approach. Israeli historian Avi SHLAIM (Sharon’s Legacy in Open Democracy: 14 January 2014) stated unequivocally that “Sharon was a man of war through and through, an Arab-hater, and an eager proponent of the doctrine of permanent conflict. He regarded the Palestinians as “murderous and treacherous” and he did not believe that the conflict with them could be resolved by diplomatic means. Following his rise to power Sharon therefore remained what he had always been – the champion of violent solutions. Baruch Kimmerling, the Israeli sociologist, coined a term to describe Sharon’s political programme: politicide – to deny the Palestinians any independent political existence in Palestine.”

Under SHARON Israel reverted back to the historical patterns of settler regimes: violence, militarism, paternalism and coercion. These patterns inevitably lead to the spreading of the cancer of moral erosion – as we have once more observed with Operation Protective Edge. Hence we can safely state that both left wing and right wing Zionist camps in Israel have been aware for some time that their historical strategies and patterns of engagement with the Palestinians and the Palestinian issue have really not brought them anywhere. But they seem stuck and incapable of moving in any direction other than retreating into denialism and pursuing “more-of-the-same” with renewed vigor.

These historical patterns also deserve closer scrutiny below.

Before we do that It is worthy noting however that it is not not only the moral cancer and failed strategies of savage violence embedded in the nature of any settler colonial project that need to be considered and appraised – the historical antecedents in Algeria, Vietnam and South Africa indicate something else that is both interesting and profound. And this may have a bearing on the claims and counter-claims of victory regarding Operation Protective Edge that we spoke about at the start of this Workshop in Doha.

In the January 1969 edition of Foreign Affairs – following the American defeat in Vietnam despite overwhelming firepower and massive aerial bombings by the US military – the former American Secretary of State Henry KISSINGER assessed the paradigmatic, conceptual and cognitive weaknesses<us of the militarily stronger party in an asymmetrical conflict under conditions of foreign occupation. This ideological and concomitant cognitive weakness that produces an intellectual iron cage – a kind of mental siege – that all settlers or occupiers suffer from or rather inflict upon themselves, has not been explored enough in the literature. But both from personal experience in the South African struggle against apartheid, and from an intelligence point of view, I would argue that the insight of Henry KISSINGER is critically important and needs far greater attention: the development of inappropriate or rigid mental models can lead to very costly mistakes.
The iron cage produced by the particular mental models inherent in anybody pursuing settler colonialism, provides those that resist it with a huge informational advantage: predictability

And the informational advantage that can be derived from this – besides the moral one – provides those that are fighting against settler colonialism, with unique and significant asymmetrical weaponry.

It is therefore no surprise that KISSINGER, in reflecting on the American defeat in the War for the liberation of Vietnam, concluded in his Foreign Affairs article of 1969 that:
“We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”

The celebrations on the streets of Gaza after the announcement of the acceptance by Israel and Hamas of the long-term ceasefire, attest to the fact that the Palestinians are not only relieved but also instinctively know that as the militarily weaker party that successfully stood its ground, that inflicted significant military casualties on the much stronger and well-equipped Israeli military, and that foiled the Israeli attempt to re-establish its deterrence, has scored an important victory by not losing.

The costs for Israel during this conflict were significant. Looking at this with the help of the analytical tools of Dynamical Systems Theory (see the PPT presentation) we observe that it has pushed key factors and systemic variables closer to thresholds and tipping points. Whilst nobody should make the mistake of judging the imminent collapse of Israel, we should not under-estimate its impact either as the real costs of this failed war by Israel will only be felt in the months to come.

From the Israeli perspective, some of these costs/burdens include the following: the massive Israeli slaughter of innocent civilians during this war already branded by international organizations such as the UN as possible war crimes; the disciplined and effective fighting and focus of Hamas fighters under extremely difficult conditions on restricting casualties to Israeli military personnel; the relatively high number of Israeli military casualties hence establishing its own minimal deterrence; the domestic rifts in the Israeli polity and its steady drift towards radicalism and extremism; the growing strength even in the USA and Western Europe for the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS) Campaign; the fault lines opening between Israel and the US and Great-Britain due to the changing public mood; as well as the maneuvering of Israel into the camp of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis where there is little or no democracy.

Whilst Israel may be boasting about its new found convergence of interests with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis, both its tactical and its strategic positioning is eroding fast. Ironically the Iraq War that the US fought following strong Israeli lobbying, has also contributed to the weakening of its superpower ally: the United States. This has contributed in significant ways to a reduction in the US global positioning as well as making it increasingly more probable that a power-shift away from the West towards an alternative new global order and architecture lead by countries such as China and Russia, will occur. Such an alternative global architecture will for example, make it much more difficult to control the transfers of money to movements such as Hamas, as the US Dollar will lose its position as the worlds sole reserve currency. It is only because the Banks transact in US Dollars that the US can control or punish the transfer of funds to parties whom it does not like or agree with.

To any strategist that is familiar with or has experience in fighting settler colonialism or foreign domination, these signs are important as they indicate that the Palestinians are incrementally but steadily gaining the moral high ground: one of the most significant determinants of victory since by depriving the Israelis of it, the important psychological dimension will exponentially shift towards the Palestinian side. Combined with the ability of guerrilla forces to learn faster and adapt quicker – as was demonstrated by the Hamas fighters during this conflict – the moral high ground can rapidly lead to psychological exhaustion, demoralization, internal division; the erosion of the will to fight and to endure casualties in the camp of the Occupier.

Following the use of the so-called Dahiya Doctrine, the Israeli military openly targets civilians and civilian areas in a systematic manner. Stephen BONAVIDES in deploring this Doctrine (he calls it State Terrorism) says the following in Truth Out on the 2nd of August 2014:

“In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel Defense Force Northern Commander Gadi Eisenkot, now the deputy chief of general staff, recommended and had approved the application of a military strategy that would target and destroy an entire civilian area rather than fight to overtake fortified positions one by one. This was in an effort to minimize IDF casualties while at the same time holding the entire civilian populace accountable for the actions of a few. A move some called revolutionary in modern warfare, the doctrine did away with the effort to distinguish between militant and civilian, using an overwhelming display of force through airstrikes to destroy the entire Lebanese Dahiya quarter.

The strategy itself calls for the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in order to induce suffering and severe distress throughout the targeted population. By targeting indiscriminately, the IDF hopes to deter further military attacks against Israel, destroy its enemies, as well as influence the population to oust the militants seen as the primary target. The IDF has planned on using the strategy since 2008, and is seen as doing so in the current conflict in Gaza based on the increasing number of civilian casualties. The result so far has been the death of more than 1,200 Palestinians, including 241 children and 130 women. Of the estimated death count, more than 70 percent have been identified as innocent civilians. The Dahiya Doctrine amounts to the direct use of state terrorism and is now the functioning military policy of the IDF.”

The moral dimension is therefore, in the application of this Doctrine, clearly lost and moreover, creates the conditions for a war-crimes accusation and prosecution of Israel.

In order to assist us in making our initial assessments – especiallythrough the prism of historical patterns, the underlying logic, and the mental modelsI will draw on some key concepts and potentially useful lessons from three well-known intellectuals of whom two were theorists of war: the Palestinian Edward SAID, the Austrian Carl VON CLAUSEWITZ and the Vietnamese Vo Nguyen GIAP.

Israel has, since its inception, been engaged in a long war of violent land confiscation as well as demographic attrition against the Palestinians. This was well understood by Israel’s early leaders – so no paradigmatic, mental model or conceptual problem at that time. David BEN-GURION told Nahum GOLDMAN, then the president of the World Jewish Congress:

‘If I were an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country … We come from Israel, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?” This sentiment was later shared by former Prime Minister Ehud BARACK who remarked that if he were born a Palestinian, he would also join a “terrorist” organization.

Prof. Stephen WALT and Prof. John MEARSHEIMER – two eminent American national security scholars – argued in their article entitled “The Israel Lobby” published in 2006 in the London Review of Books, that Zionism is not only a morally flawed project that is built on the opposite of American values, but that Israel is also a strategic liability for America. Furthermore they contend that the “final reason to question Israel’s strategic value is that it does not behave like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore US requests and renege on promises (including pledges to stop building settlements and to refrain from ‘targeted assassinations’ of Palestinian leaders). Israel has provided sensitive military technology to potential rivals like China, in what the State Department inspector-general called ‘a systematic and growing pattern of unauthorized transfers’. According to the General Accounting Office, Israel also ‘conducts the most aggressive espionage operations against the US of any ally’”

The two American Professors went on to write that “Israel’s backers also portray it as a country that has sought peace at every turn and shown great restraint even when provoked. The Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. Yet on the ground, Israel’s record is not distinguishable from that of its opponents. Ben-Gurion acknowledged that the early Zionists were far from benevolent towards the Palestinian Arabs, who resisted their encroachments – which is hardly surprising, given that the Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab land. In the same way, the creation of Israel in 1947-48 involved acts of ethnic cleansing, including executions, massacres and rapes by Jews, and Israel’s subsequent conduct has often been brutal, belying any claim to moral superiority. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli security forces killed between 2700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the overwhelming majority of them unarmed. The IDF murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners of war in both the 1956 and 1967 wars, while in 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000 Palestinians from the newly conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights.”

Naturally and as in all struggles against settler colonialism, a Palestinian national movement was born to resist this; to struggle for national self-determination and the restoration of their basic human rights. The Palestinians therefore not only have the right to exist and live on their land, but also have the right to defend themselves against any form of external aggression, invasion or occupation.These rights are inalienable and are not to be recognized or restored as part of a quid pro quo: Israel must leave the illegally occupied territories – all of it – as this is the source of its insecurity.

As Henry SIEGMAN has frequently argued: Israel can and has to end the occupation immediately by simply withdrawing from the illegally Occupied Territories; and there need not be any negotiations about it. What can then be negotiated after this Israeli occupation has been ended, is where exactly the Israeli borders will be. He says (Cf the Amy GOODMAN interview of 14 July 2014):

“There seems to be near-universal agreement in the United States with President Barack Obama’s observation that Israel, like every other country, has the right and obligation to defend its citizens from threats directed at them from beyond its borders…The answer to the second question — whether a less lethal course was not available to protect Israel’s civilian population — is (unintentionally?) implicit in the formulation of President Barack Obama’s defense of Israel’s actions: namely, the right and obligation of all governments to protect their civilian populations from assaults from across their borders. But where, exactly, are Israel’s borders?”

When considering the causes and the Israeli fabricated trigger of this military assault on Gaza (see The Geo-Strategic significance of Gaza in the Menu on your right hand side) in which we highlighted the formation of a Palestinian Unity Government between Fatah and Hamas as one of the principal immediate causes, it is worth quoting from the New York Times article of 17 July 2014 by Jonathan THRALL of the International Crisis Group:

“Seeing a region swept by popular protests against leaders who couldn’t provide for their citizens’ basic needs, Hamas opted to give up official control of Gaza rather than risk being overthrown. Despite having won the last elections, in 2006, Hamas decided to transfer formal authority to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. That decision led to a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization, on terms set almost entirely by the P.L.O. chairman andPalestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas. Israel immediately sought to undermine the reconciliation agreement by preventing Hamas leaders and Gaza residents from obtaining the two most essential benefits of the deal: the payment of salaries to 43,000 civil servants who worked for the Hamas government and continue to administer Gaza under the new one, and the easing of the suffocating border closures imposed by Israel and Egypt that bar most Gazans’ passage to the outside world. Yet, in many ways, the reconciliation government could have served Israel’s interests. It offered Hamas’s political adversaries a foothold in Gaza; it was formed without a single Hamas member; it retained the same Ramallah-based prime minister, deputy prime ministers, finance minister and foreign minister; and, most important, it pledged to comply with the three conditions for Western aid long demanded by America and its European allies: nonviolence, adherence to past agreements and recognition of Israel.”

This Operation Protective Edge has brought the Palestinians even closer together (and Israeli society even more divided) so from the Israeli perspective: what has it achieved politically as we now seem to be back where we started: a Palestinian Unity Government?

In The Independent on Sunday of 27 July 2014, the Israeli historian Avi SHLAIM said the following in an article in which he denounced the idea of “balanced reporting” – a favorite tactical trick in Israeli diplomacy:

“The origins of the current war in Gaza is a case in point. As always, Israel claims to be acting in self-defence, blaming the victims of its military aggression for their own misfortunes. Yet the basic cause for this war is the 47-year-old Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.
True, in 2005 Israel carried out a unilateral disengagement of Gaza. But, under international law, it remains the occupying power because it continues to control access to the strip by land, sea and air. An occupying power has a legal obligation to protect civilians in the areas it controls, yet Israel has been shelling and killing them.
Israel claims its most recent incursion into Gaza was a response to Hamas rocket attacks. Here are some facts that do not fit comfortably into the narrative of a peace-loving nation that is up against a fanatical, murderous terrorist organisation. In 2006, Hamas won a fair and free Palestinian election and formed a government, seeking a long-term ceasefire with Israel. Israel refused to negotiate.
In 2007, Hamas and Fatah formed a national unity government with the same agenda. Israel resorted to economic warfare to undermine this government and encouraged Fatah to stage a coup to drive Hamas from power. Hamas pre-empted the coup with a violent seizure of power in Gaza.
In flagrant violation of international law, Israel then imposed a blockade (still in force today) on the 1.8 million inhabitants of Gaza. Four months ago, Hamas reached an accord with Fatah, and another national unity government was formed, this time without a single Hamas-affiliated member but with the old agenda of negotiating an end to the conflict with Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hysterically attacked it as a vote for terror, not for peace. He used the abduction of three Jewish teenagers on the West Bank as an excuse for a violent crackdown on Hamas supporters there, although Hamas had nothing to do with it. The Hamas rocket attacks were a response to this provocation.”

As we also pointed out in our introductory first piece on the Geo-Strategic Significance of Gaza – the significance of which we will deal with in our third piece – significant tension had been building up between President Barack OBAMA and Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU. The Wall Street Journal’s national security correspondent, Adam ENTOUS, pointed out in the Wall Street Journal of 06 August 2014 that Israel’s security interests and those of Egypt under General SISI, converged; whilst those between Israel and the USA diverged:

“U.S. officials, who tried to intervene in the initial days after the conflict broke out on July 8 to try to find a negotiated solution, soon realized that Mr. Netanyahu’s office wanted to run the show with Egypt and to keep the Americans at a distance, according to U.S., European and Israeli officials. The Americans, in turn, felt betrayed by what they saw as a series of “mean spirited” leaks, which they interpreted as a message from Mr. Netanyahu that U.S. involvement was neither welcomed nor needed. Reflecting Egypt’s importance, Mr. Gilad [Brig-Gen Amos GILAD is the Israeli military intelligence liaison with Egypt] and other officials took Mr. Sisi’s “temperature” every day during the war to make sure he was comfortable with the military operation as it intensified. Israeli officials knew television pictures of dead Palestinians would at some point bring Cairo to urge Israel to stop.”

We should not forget that NETANYAHU resigned as Finance Minister from the Cabinet of Ariel SHARON in 2005 precisely around the issue of the unilateral disengagement by Israel from Gaza:

“Netanyahu resigned during the August 7 cabinet meeting, saying afterward that he believed Gaza disengagement would create a “base for terror,” a policy with which he could no longer associate himself. He also opposed the unilateral nature of the withdrawal, saying reciprocity is better for Israel.Sharon charged Netanyahu with flipflopping from his earlier support. Indeed, Netanyahu voted four times for disengagement: twice in the cabinet, on June 6, 2004, and February 20, 2005, and twice in the Knesset, on October 26, 2004, and February 16, 2005. (He was absent on a Knesset vote held on July 20, 2005.) Moreover, Netanyahu pointedly refused to leave the government despite mounting appeals by critics of disengagement in the eighteen months since Sharon announced his intention to pull out of Gaza” (David Makovsky: Policy Watch No 511; August 17, 2005).

Nor should we forget what close SHARON confidant Dov WEISGLASS said in an interview with Ari SHAVIT in Haaretz of 06 October 2004: ” ‘The disengagement is actually formaldehyde,’ he said. ‘It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians.’ Asked why the disengagement plan had been hatched, Weisglass replied: ‘Because in the fall of 2003 we understood that everything was stuck. And although by the way the Americans read the situation, the blame fell on the Palestinians, not on us, Arik [Sharon] grasped that this state of affairs could not last, that they wouldn’t leave us alone, wouldn’t get off our case. Time was not on our side. There was international erosion, internal erosion. Domestically, in the meantime, everything was collapsing. The economy was stagnant, and the Geneva Initiative had gained broad support. And then we were hit with the letters of officers and letters of pilots and letters of commandos (refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories). These were not weird kids with green ponytails and a ring in their nose with a strong odor of grass. These were people like Spector’s group; really our finest young people’ (Yiftah Spector, a renowned Air Force pilot who signed the pilot’s letter refusing to fly missions against targets in the West Bank and Gaza. ) Weisglass does not deny that the main achievement of the Gaza plan is the freezing of the peace process in a “legitimate manner.”

The Geneva Initiative, Brig-Gen Yitah SPECTOR and the core of the Israeli Refuseniks all formed part of the Spier Process facilitated by the South African Government under President Thabo MBEKI at the request of Yasser ARAFAT and the fledgling peace camp in Israel under Yossi BEILIN – the tactical aim of the Spier Process was to try and help put pressure on Israel to restart the then stalled Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process for a two-state solution that SHARON and WEISGLASS clearly opposed. SPECTOR was involved in the attack by Israel on the American Warship the USS Liberty in 1967 in which 34 US Navy Personnel were killed and Terry HALBARDIER, the American sailor who managed to send the SOS that saved the USS Liberty from complete Israeli destruction, died recently in the US. SPECTOR also flew one of the planes during the 1981 Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

Ari SHAVIT in Haaretz of 06 October 2004 continued in the same article covering his interview with WEISGLASS:

“He doesn’t deny that he supported the disengagement from the start. He doesn’t hide the fact that he placed the facts on Sharon’s desk. The political problem, the economic problem, the problem of refusenik soldiers. And he made it clear to the boss that the international community will never let up. That the Americans will not be able to support us for all time. But in the end I wasn’t the one who made the decision, Weisglass says. The prime minister made the decision. While he, the bureau chief, was simply there at his side. He, the faithful advocate, simply sat with his client in the room throughout the entire process..From your point of view, then, your major achievement is to have frozen the political process legitimately? “That is exactly what happened. You know, the term `political process’ is a bundle of concepts and commitments. The political process is the establishment of a Palestinian state with all the security risks that entails. The political process is the evacuation of settlements, it’s the return of refugees, it’s the partition of Jerusalem. And all that has now been frozen.” So you have carried out the maneuver of the century? And all of it with authority and permission? “When you say `maneuver,’ it doesn’t sound nice. It sounds like you said one thing and something else came out. But that’s the whole point. After all, what have I been shouting for the past year? That I found a device, in cooperation with the management of the world [USA under George W BUSH during which SHARON took the ideas of the national camp and turned them into a political reality that is accepted by the the US Congress where the relevant resolution was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 405-7, and in the Senate by 95-5 Ed], to ensure that there will be no stopwatch here. That there will be no timetable to implement the settlers’ nightmare. I have postponed that nightmare indefinitely. Because what I effectively agreed to with the Americans was that part of the settlements would not be dealt with at all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the Palestinians turn into Finns. That is the significance of what we did. The significance is the freezing of the political process. And when you freeze that process you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and you prevent a discussion about the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package that is called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed from our agenda indefinitely. And all this with authority and permission. All with a presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress. What more could have been anticipated? What more could have been given to the settlers?”

In considering Gaza and Operation Protective Edge, the study and correct understanding of the adversary, of the self and the context, is of critical importance. And over the years, the Israeli tactics have taken on familiar patterns. These patterns are the result of the iron cage mental models and moral flaws inherent in settler colonialism and not only do they provide us with exceptionally rich sources of information, but they also produce societal logics and predictable patterns.

These historical facts, trajectories and patterns create a certain kind of path-dependency and blind spots that facilitate insight in the adversary and foresight regarding their likely future paths of action. We will briefly elaborate on this by looking at what we mean by 1) path-dependency and 2) blind spots.

From an intelligence perspective, path-dependency is an important analytic key for unlocking rich sources of contextual information. From a strategic perspective, path-dependency can create funnels that will lead to a significant narrowing of possible outcomes. Strategy (largely arrived at through abductive and inductive reasoning) is often confused and conflated with planning (largely arrived at utilizing deductive reasoning), but must always lead to to an end state in which we are positioned in such a way that the probabilities of our our goal achievement are improved and enhanced.

Maneuvering our adversary onto the slippery slope of the funnel through the exploitation of contextual path-dependencies and blind spots, is a frequently used stratagem in asymmetrical warfare.

See Image 1 at the end of this article: FUNNEL

Path-dependency in academic literature is a well-studied notion. Paul A DAVID of Stanford University (Cliometrica — The Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, v.1, no.2, Summer 2007) argues that:

“’Path dependence’ is an important concept for social scientists engaged in studying processes of change, as it is for students of dynamic phenomena in nature. A dynamic process whose evolution is governed by its own history is “path dependent.” The concept, thus, is very general in its scope, referring equally to developmental sequences (whether in evolutionary biology or physics) and social dynamics (involving social interactions among economic or political agents) that are characterized by positive feedbacks and self-reinforcing dynamics. Although the assertion that “history matters” has come to be coupled frequently with references to the concept of path dependence, the precise meaning of the latter term—and hence the significance of the former expression—more often than not remains rather cloudy. This is unnecessary as well as unfortunate. The fundamental idea is straightforward enough to be intuitively grasped without any instruction in economics; indeed, a thorough training in modern economics actually might interfere with human intuitions about history, and especially about processes involving historically contingent evolution. Even the formalizations of the concept of path dependence (to be introduced subsequently) are far from forbidding and readily will repay the effort spent in absorbing them. They will be seen to lend a useful measure of precision to descriptions of the special class of dynamical systems that are neither completely deterministic nor purely random in their workings, and in which the specific details of history govern the unfolding course of development.”

Patterns not only lead to path-dependencies but have other interesting effects too. Behavioral patterns are often tacit; and this means that it becomes behavior-without-awareness. For intelligence officers, behavior-without-awareness – like thinking-without-awareness – create blind spots and these become another rich source of information when studying the adversary. Many specialized techniques have been developed in intelligence praxis, to harvest such information unobtrusively from the adversary.

Furthermore, there is a surprising thing about surprise: it is most often not caused by a lack of information. Very often, we have the information right in front of us but we are unable to see its significance or relevance to other facts. Likewise strong convictions – such as ideological convictions – may cause informational blindness and this remains the major cause of foresight failure. This phenomenon is often driven by three factors: belief perseverance, judgmental heuristics and groupthink. The Israeli intelligence and security services suffer from a serious dose of informational blindness: not only did Hamas transform itself into an effective fighting force; it also built the required capabilities based on their new war-fighting Doctrines. This happened undetected but right in front of their eyes, because Israel focused on imaginary nuclear threats from Iran. Its Mental Model does not allow it to see what is really “out there in the real world” because it has hardened, narrowed and became rigid.

(Readers that have completed our Basic Course in Intelligence Analysis will understand precisely how this happens cognitively and psychologically)

In order to understand the significance of this, it is worthwhile getting a brief historical perspective through the eloquent voice of the Palestinian intellectual Edward SAID; and in particular his description of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon In reading this and several other historical documents written by Palestinians and Israelis, one is struck by the patterns and enduring – and therefore predictable – nature of the Israeli political-military template vis-a-vis the Middle East and the Palestinian national movement. Readers should therefore keep the patterns that emerged during the British colonial occupation of Palestine, the 1947 expulsions of the Palestinians, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and Operation Defensive Wall (sometimes called Defensive Shield) of 2002 in mind as we consider and begin to reflect on Operation Protective Edge of 2014.

As mentioned earlier, in the policy-document A Clean Break: a new strategy for the defense of the realm” drawn-up in 1996 by a group of American and Israeli neo-Conservatives for Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU argued for not only ending the land-for-peace foundations of the Oslo Accords, but also for the reconfiguring and Balkanization of the entire Middle East. The idea was not new for in 1982, Oded YINON, an Israeli journalist previously working for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, published a document titled ‘A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties.’ He advised that for Israel to maintain its regional superiority, it must fragment its surrounding Arab states into smaller units. The document, later labelled as ‘Yinon Plan’, implied that Arabs and Muslims killing each other in endless sectarian wars was Israel’s best insurance policy.

In the SHAHAK translation of this document, the Editor notes:

“In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, says that the area of the [proposed] Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.” Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: ‘The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.’ This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme has been documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG publication, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism (1980), by Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach’s study documents, in convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties. The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out to the minutest detail. The second and more barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well, in fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding their desire for a strong and independent Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They also seek acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as by the Palestinian people. What they want and what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980’s,” talks about “far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967” that are created by the “very stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel.” The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very much an active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times of contlict, such as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled “Israel Talks of a New Exodus” is included in this publication to demonstrate past Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides the main Zionist document we present, other Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine. It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982, that the “far-reaching opportunities” of which Zionist strategists have been thinking are the same “opportunities” of which they are trying to convince the world and which they claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion. ”

So: divide your adversaries and make them fight each other violently – isn’t that what was happening in Lebanon in the 1980’s and between Hamas and Fatah in the 2000’s? Isn’t this being fueled between the Shi’i and Sunni communities accross the region as we speak?

So this regional approach and desire to reconfigure the Middle East through violence, by dividing the adversary and setting them up to fight each other (instead of fighting the Colonizer), is really not new at all and the pattern is as old as colonialism itself and therefore part of a certain kind of path-dependency and predictability.

It is therefore also worth noting the geo-strategic origins of the term “Middle East”. Roderic H. DAVISON in Foreign Affairs: July 1960 noted that:

“In the same year in which Hogarth put the stamp of geographical approval on the new Near East, Middle East was also born. This was the creation of the American naval officer, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan had made his reputation with the publication in 1890 of “The Influence of Sea Power upon History.” Soon he was sought out by magazine editors for articles on naval affairs and world strategy. Russian expansion, the partition of China, and the German penetration of Turkey, as well as the American conquest of the Philippines, turned Mahan’s attention to Asia. Among his articles on Asia was a piece on “The Persian Gulf and International Relations” which appeared in the September 1902 issue of theNational Review of London. Here Mahan considered the Anglo-Russian contest along with the new element of the projected German Berlin-to-Baghdad railway with its probable terminus on the Persian Gulf. Envisioning the desirability of Anglo-German coöperation to keep the Russians out, he affirmed the need for Britain to maintain a strong naval position, with bases, in the Persian Gulf region. “The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will some day need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar . . . . The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force, if occasion arises, about Aden, India and the Gulf.” And so the term Middle East saw the light of day just over a half-century ago.”

The “Middle East” – a Western conceptual invention as other parts of the world use different terminologies to describe that region – carries with it the baggage of its invention: colonial geography and social engineering.

We now see a series of strong patterns – some even carried in concepts – emerge and that have hardened into a template within a particular Mental Model. As I cannot do justice to the views of Edward SAID and since he makes a compelling case, I will simply utilize a longish quotation from his article published in the London Review of Books in 2002 under the title: “We know who we Are”. He was writing following the invasion of the West-Bank by the Israeli Army in an Operation called Defensive Wall or Mivtza Homat Magen (sometimes incorrectly reported as Defensive Shield).

Readers should note the similar patterns a real cognitive and behavioral template – in each of these Israeli operations: the 1982 Lebanon invasion, Protective Wall (2002) and Protective Edge (2014).

Prior to this invasion – seen by many as the largest military operation in the West Bank since 1967 – this is what then Prime Minister Ariel SHARON said as reported by Matt REES in Time Magazine of 18 March 2002:

“The Palestinians must be hit, and it must be very painful,” he said. “We must cause them losses, victims, so that they feel a heavy price.”

This sounds very familiar in 2014 doesn’t it? The language of “paying a heavy price” is the paternalistic, authoritarian and violent language of the Colonizer. All colonized people recognize it immediately and instinctively.

At the start of Operation Defensive Wall in 2002, the Mukataa – Headquarters of Yasir ARAFAT was invaded, damaged by tanks and bulldozers and he was placed under – yes you guessed it – a long term siege.
I spent a few hours late at night in the heavily damaged Mukataa with ARAFAT at that time to convey him the good wishes of the Government and people of South Africa with all of us being rushed in and out of the room by a phalanx of security personnel as Israel helicopter gunships flew overhead and missiles were fired in the distance.

The Mukataa itself has an interesting colonial history; dating back to the British Mandate, were a series Forts designed bySir Charles TEGART – a British Policeman who designed the forts in 1938 based on his experiences in suppressing the Indian insurgency that eventually lead to Indian Independence. When the Arab Revolt started in 1936 in protest against the decision of the British Colonial Government to allow the emigration of Zionist settlers from Britain to Palestine, TEGART was brought in to quell the unrest. Apart from his techniques for extracting information from colonial subjects, he also built a system of Big Brother style surveillance as well as a series of Forts – which he proposed to be connected with a Fence. They were built of reinforced concrete with water systems that would allow them to withstand a month-long siege. Dozens of the structures were built according to the same basic plan, along the so-called “Tegart’s Wall” of the northern borders with Lebanon and Syria.

At the end of this article in IMAGE 2 is a photo as an example of a TEGART Fort of which more than 60 were built all over Palestine during the period of British occupation.

As we pointed out, Edward SAID wrote this article in the London Review of Books during Operation Defensive Wall (2002) but it also worth pointing out that this was written before the 2003 invasion of Iraq – an invasion that we have argued elsewhere (See The US and China in the Menu on your right hand side) was an inflection point in the post-Cold War history that significantly shaped and influenced the current global context and dynamic. The pattern is now very distinct and predictable: the Israelis are locked into a self-imposed mental siege inherent in the nature of managing what from the Palestinian point of view is characterized as settler-colonialism.

This then is what Edward SAID wrote already in 2002:

“Lebanon was heavily bombed by Israeli warplanes on 4 June 1982.

Two days later the Israeli Army breached the country’s southern border. Menachem Begin was then Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon Minister of Defence. The immediate reason for the invasion was the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to Britain, blamed by Begin and Sharon on the PLO, whose forces in South Lebanon had been observing a ceasefire for a year. By 13 June, Beirut was under siege, even though the Israeli Government had originally said it planned to go no further into Lebanon than the Awali River, 35 km north of the border. Later, it became all too clear that Sharon was trying to kill Yasir Arafat by bombing everything around him. There was a blockade of humanitarian aid; water and electricity were cut off, and a sustained aerial bombing campaign destroyed hundreds of buildings. By mid-August, when the siege ended, 18,000 Palestinians and Lebanese, most of them civilians, had been killed.

The civil war between right-wing Christian militias and left-wing Muslim and Arab nationalist groups had already lasted seven years. Although Israel sent its Army into Lebanon only once before 1982, it had early been sought as an ally by the Christian militias, who co-operated with Sharon’s forces during the siege. Sharon’s main ally was Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Phalange Party, who was elected President by the Lebanese Parliament on 23 August. The Palestinians had unwisely entered the civil war on the side of the National Movement, a loose coalition of parties that included Amal, a forerunner of Hizbollah (which was to play the major role in finally driving the Israelis out of Lebanon in May 2000). Faced with the prospect of Israeli vassalage after Sharon’s Army had in effect brought about his election, Gemayel seems to have demurred and was assassinated on 14 September. Israeli troops occupied Beirut, supposedly to keep order, and two days later, inside a security cordon provided by the Israeli Army, Gemayel’s vengeful extremists massacred two thousand Palestinian refugees at the camps of Sabra and Shatila.

Under UN and of course US supervision, French troops had entered Beirut on 21 August in the aftermath of the siege and were later joined by US and other European forces. The PLO fighters were evacuated from Lebanon; and by the beginning of September Arafat and a small band of advisers and soldiers had relocated to Tunis. The Taif Accord of 1989 prepared the way for a settlement of the civil war the following year. The old confessional system – under which different religious groups are allocated a specific number of Parliamentary seats – was more or less restored and remains in place today.

Earlier this year Sharon was quoted as regretting his failure to kill Arafat in Beirut. Not for want of trying – dozens of buildings were destroyed, hundreds of people killed. The events of 1982 hardened ordinary Arabs, I think, to the idea that Israel would use planes, missiles, tanks and helicopters to attack civilians indiscriminately, and that neither the US nor the Arab governments would do anything to stop it.

The invasion of Lebanon was the first full-scale contemporary attempt at regime change by one sovereign country against another in the Middle East. I bring it up as a messy backdrop to the current crisis. The main difference between 1982 and 2002 is that the Palestinians are now under siege inside Palestinian territories that have been occupied by Israel since 1967. The main similarity is the disproportionate nature of Israeli actions: the hundreds of tanks and bulldozers used to enter towns and villages like Jenin or refugee camps like Deheisheh, where troops once more set about killing, vandalising, obstructing ambulances and first-aid workers, cutting off water and electricity and so on. All with the support of the US, whose President called Sharon a ‘man of peace’ during the worst assaults of last March and April. Sharon’s purpose went far beyond ‘rooting out terror’: his soldiers destroyed every computer and carried off files and hard drives from the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Ministries of Education, Finance and Health, and vandalised offices and libraries.

I don’t want to rehearse my criticisms of Arafat’s tactics or the failures of his deplorable regime during the Oslo negotiations and thereafter. Besides, as I write, the man is only just hanging onto his life: his crumbling quarters in Ramallah are still besieged and Sharon is doing everything possible to injure him short of actually having him killed. What concerns me, rather, is the idea of regime change as an attractive notion for individuals, ideologies and institutions that are vastly more powerful than their adversaries. It is now, it seems, taken for granted that great military power licenses large-scale political and social change, whatever damage that may entail. And the fact that one’s own side will not suffer many casualties seems only to stimulate more fantasies about surgical strikes, clean war, high technology battlefields, changing the entire map, creating democracy and so on, all of this giving rise to dreams of omnipotence.

In the current American propaganda campaign for regime change in Iraq, the people of that country, the vast majority of whom have suffered from poverty, malnutrition and illness as a result of ten years of sanctions, have dropped out of sight. This is entirely in keeping with US Middle East policy, which is built on two mighty pillars: the security of Israel and plentiful supplies of inexpensive oil. The complex mosaic of traditions, religions, cultures, ethnicities and histories in the Arab world is lost to US and Israeli strategic planners. Iraq is either a ‘threat’ to its neighbours, which, in its currently weakened and besieged condition, is a nonsensical idea, or a ‘threat’ to the freedom and security of the United States, which is still more absurd. I am not even going to bother to add my condemnations of Saddam Hussein: I shall take it for granted that he deserves to be ousted and punished. Worst of all, he is a threat to his own people.” (Edward SAID: We know who we are: LRB 2002).

The moral cancer of settler colonialism and occupation as well as the predictable patterns of behavior and strategies that its mental models lead to, make of it a phenomenon that is well-understood and therefore quite predictable. This gives the Palestinians an amazing informational advantage: knowing the context and knowing the adversary. For as long as the Occupying side remains locked into its mental and moral siege, it will remain transparent, stuck and inflexible. The political task is to lead them of out of this.. With Political Zionism having exhausted itself and entering into a phase of decomposition – accompanied by more denialism and calls for more vicious violence as Israel drifts into further extremism – it is now incumbent on the Palestinians to come forward with the outlines of a political end state that will assist the Israelis out of their conundrum and break the patterns of the past.

All sides should by now understand that for as long as the occupied “don’t lose”; they really win.. There are important additional concepts that must be taken into consideration too. In the third and final piece on Gaza, I will inter alia apply the Clauzewitzian concepts of the “culminating point of attack as well as the culminating point of victory”, as well as the “political tasks” as articulated by Vo Ngueyen GIAP to explore how this logjam can be broken.

The worn-out face and posture of Prime Minister NETANYAHU at the Press Conference yesterday in which he claimed “victory”, was reminisced of the equally false claim of victory made by President George W. BUSH at the end of the American assault on Iraq in 2003.

And all the signals are there that deep down the Israelis know that they have reached a dead end; that the Palestinian unity is stronger than before and that this round belongs to Hamas: “because they did not lose”.

IMAGE 1: FUNNEL

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IMAGE 2 : EXAMPLE OF TERGAT FORT IN PALESTINE

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PP: The Geo-Strategic significance of Gaza

PONDERING POINTS: Short, quick-and-dirty pieces of thinking out loud

PP1: The The Geo-Strategic Significance of Gaza

©Andre ZAAIMAN 2014

 

“Thus in the beginning the world was so made that certain signs come before certain events.”  

Cicero

The current violent assault by Israel on a territory (Gaza) and a people (Palestinians) that it has displaced and occupies – and on Hamas in particular – has, at a tactical level, its domestic roots in the 2005 unilateral “withdrawal” of Israel from Gaza by the then Government of Ariel SHARON. It signaled the end of the “peace process” which had already by then, especially following the 1995 murder of Yitzhak RABIN by a fellow Israeli Jew and the death of the Palestinian leader Yasser ARAFAT in 2004 – a year after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq – started to morph from a real peace process into a mere extension of war-by-other-means.

As indicated amongst other things by several Israeli military Operations such as Defensive Wall (2002), Cast Lead (2008/9) and now Protective Edge (2014) – all militarily aimed at but failing to restore Israeli deterrence – as well as the unabated construction and expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the Jerusalem area, that the principal tactical goals for Israel in its domestic and regional theaters are respectively:

  1. The division of the Palestinians, geographically (physical) and organizationally (as a political movement), in order to fragment and ultimately conquer the West Bank and make the establishment of a viable Palestinian State, impossible. This divide-and-rule method is as old as colonial conquest itself and is one of the reasons why Israeli historians such as Ilan PAPPE calls this ethnic cleansing. It is also why the recent rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas is one of the principal reasons why Israel decided to go after Hamas now: Israel wants the Palestinians to remain divided and fractured; and it wants Hamas (which analytically fits into the broader ambit of Political Islam), to become depoliticized and disarmed. In the long run, it is still pursuing the defeat of the Palestinian national movement, the reduction in the numbers of the Palestinian population in the area as a whole, and the obliteration of any forms or traces of Palestinian history in historical Palestine.
  2. The re-establishment of the regional status quo ante bellum – meaning as it was before the Arab Spring and rise of Political Islam in the Middle East. Current dominant groups in Israel, as well as those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the Emirates cannot afford that a situation of real, majoritarian democracy based on free and fair elections in which all their citizens participate freely and equally, prevails: at least in the case of Israel, until it has reduced the Palestinian (non-Jewish) numbers through a process of social and geographical attrition to such an extent, that it would never pose a threat to the ethnic concept of a Jewish State, secured through the engineering – by means of a series of wars, expulsions, geo-political “facts-on-the-ground” and annexations – of a “permanent Jewish majority”. This process started in 1947 and continues to this day; it explains the national obsession of Israelis with demographics and geography. From an Israeli perspective, until the Palestinians are bludgeoned and weakened to the point where they accept this exclusivist, ethnic and Jewish character of the State of Israel and permanently give up any historical claims to the land of their birth, there can simply be no peace.

Reverting back to the status quo ante bellum, will therefore permit Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others to once more demonize, marginalize and diminish the forces of Political Islam (which includes Hamas) and recapture the strategic initiative. Moderate forces such as those of Political Islam that can square Islam and Democracy (for example such as in Turkey) therefore pose a real threat to the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia, hence both countries prefer radical Islamic variants as opposition, which can be thought and fought through the trope of “fighting terrorists”. That off course should not be read as the slightest endorsement of terrorism – this is an analytic exercise aimed at understanding and not a treatise on morals or moral judgment: terrorism in any form is obviously quite simply, wrong. Fighting settler colonial occupation and expansion should however not be equated with terrorism either; there is no moral equivalence between an Occupier and the Occupied. And Israel is, under international law, an Occupier.

Viewed as a complex system, the Middle East can only be understood as the simultaneous interplay of various components. These components interact horizontally with each other within three scales: domestic, regional and global. But these components also interact vertically between scales creating an intricate, dynamic interplay of individual actors, groups, coalitions and alliances. It can be visualized as an adapted Rubik’s Cube.

Rubik's Cube Not understanding these horizontal and vertical relationships and interactions will render a proper understanding of the current situation rather difficult if not impossible.

The oversimplifications below should therefore be understood as a first attempt to start drawing initial, broad lines of an eventual analysis primarily focused on the higher, strategic level: and not as a deliberate neglect of detail or cutting with a blunt knife.

We would first like to start with two caveats and one observation:

  1. Caveat: The views of the Obama White House on these matters differ in significant ways from the majority views on Capitol Hill; but the White House views are more in synch with the sentiments of the majority of Americans. The restocking of Israeli munitions by the US, which takes place under their existing treaties and legal obligations to each other, was deliberately leaked to the Press by the Israelis as a way embarrass Obama and to cover up their feud.
  2. Caveat: Obama will not be President forever: the next US President is more likely to step in line with the views of Capitol Hill; views that are heavily influenced by the powerful, well-organized and monied pro-Israeli lobbies.
  3. Observation: In the current situation, there are significant misalignments and divergences between US and Israeli strategies in the Middle East, revealed through their differing positions on both the Iranian and the Palestinian issues.

Operation Protective Edge was launched by Israel following its initiation through a fabricated trigger, a favored technique of the Israeli security establishment. But just as the incessant focus of Israel on Iran’s supposed nuclear weapons program, Gaza and Operation Protective Edge is a ruse; a distraction and obfuscation of the real target which in this instance, at the tactical level, is the West Bank and the Jerusalem area which is central to making the establishment of a viable Palestinian State, impossible. Regionally, the strategic target for Israel (and Saudi Arabia), remains Iran – and therefore the subversion of the current White House outreach to Iran and the nuclear negotiations – since they have already successfully reversed the effects of the wave of popular uprisings which helped bringing forces of Political Islam initially in power in places such as Egypt, Tunisia and Gaza (Hamas).

Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt wants to return to the regional situation where forces of Political Islam (such as Hamas in Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) are perceived as “terrorists”, internationally isolated and turned into outlaws. Iran must also once more be perceived as the grave “threat” – in much the same vein as Saddam HUSSAIN’s Iraq was portrayed until it was militarily attacked and invaded by the US.

Operation Protective Edge, when seen from this vantage point, therefore forms part of a broader, regional strategy by Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to seize back the initiative from Turkey and Qatar and ultimately to end the Iranian rapprochement. The overthrow of the Mursi- Government in Egypt and the attempted destruction of Hamas in Gaza through Operation Protective Edge, are therefore not separate events but intimately linked.

As we have argued before in another piece on this Website (The US-China-Africa Part 1 America: see MENU on your right), the current world order has entered a phase of decomposition and realignment of forces. This military assault on Gaza must also be located within this context too and several other international, regional and domestic driving factors must be considered as well, which include:

  1. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the USA, actively but stealthily pushed and nurtured by Israel and Saudi Arabia at the time
  2. The subsequent decline of American influence in the Middle East and the general weakening of its strategic position in the world
  3. The US Pivot or Re-Balancing to Asia and its outreach to Iran
  4. The rise of political Islam in the Middle East through the Arab Spring and its reversal starting in Egypt following Turkish over-reach
  5. The emergence of countries (Russia and China) and alliances (BRICS) that are perceived to threaten American primacy
  6. Hyper-connectivity and Technology that facilitates rapid flows of both information and new forms of informational weaponry

We can therefore begin to make the argument that both Israel and Saudi Arabia seem to be adjusting, sometimes quite violently, to the reality of the absence of an active and offensive, US military prioritization in and of the region: Asia, Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent Africa seem to be the new American military priorities. The Middle Eastern political and security game is influenced by the global, geo-strategic moves of America, China and Russia; but its actors are increasingly regional and driven by the conflicting interests of their own regional positions and interests.

This implies that both countries (Israel and Saudi Arabia and their allies,) are likely to get more directly involved (albeit through proxies) in places ranging from Lebanon to Syria and Iraq – they will rely less on the US to “do the dirty work” in a manner-of-speaking. The outbursts and defiance of Israel in respect of some of the initiatives of OBAMA and KERRY concerning Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, a clear sign that they have understood that they must take decisive action when their interests require it; even if this comes at the price of tension with their principal big power ally, the USA. But this also means that actors such as Russia will, for geo-strategic reasons, become more directly involved too. Hence the metaphor of the Rubik’s Cube becomes important again as an analytical tool.

The successful reversal of the initial ascendency of political Islam by Saudi-Arabia, Israel, Egypt and the Emiratis has solidified their loose alliance based on a convergence of interests. From an Israeli perspective, this is useful in terms of intelligence and military coordination and cooperation, but highly embarrassing from the point of view of its diplomacy: it needs to present itself as democratic and Western because its national security concept was hitherto based on this.

But it now finds itself in the company of states that nobody would really hold up as beacons of human rights and democracy.

As key international actors are in the process of repositioning (strategy, goals, capabilities); recalibrating (their perceptions and calculations of themselves and others) and reconfiguring (power and alliances), countries will have to adjust and adapt. This reconfiguring of power-balances brings with it significant winners and losers – countries that will behave differently if not irrationally, as a consequence of either losing or gaining of influence and power. For example, presently Turkey and Qatar – key sponsors of the various projects of Political Islam – are licking their wounds and regrouping, whilst Iran has significantly improved its prospects. Israel suffers from the cancer that all projects based on dispossession and violent occupation suffer from and in the long run succumb to: moral degeneration from within. Israel and Saudi Arabia, having built their strategic and national security conceptions upon a close attachment to a great Power – the USA in particular – have found both the military withdrawals from the Middle East and the Pivot to Asia disconcerting. The overtures of the Obama White House to Iran being almost the final straw that “broke the camels back.”

The current tension between Obama’s White House, Israel and Saudi Arabia has been long in the making. Leaving aside the specific characteristics and brash conduct of the current Israeli Prime Minister, including the condescending attitudes regularly on display towards the “naive” Americans – it was Obama’s tacit backing of the rise of Political Islam across the Middle East during the Arab Spring that really set off loud alarm bells in Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

To fully understand this, it is necessary to step back to the discussions and decisions about Strategy and Tactics in the movements of Political Islam during the late 1990s and early 2000’s. And to also revisit Israeli tactics during that period, most notably its widely reported announcements at the time, that it “would no longer guarantee the safety of Yasser ARAFAT (PLO) and his subsequent death in November 2004 in France. I will focus on Hamas – the bête noir for the Sharon and Netanyahu Governments, specifically the decision of Hamas in 2005 to pursue the path to political power through the ballot box in the Occupied Territories. For the sake of brevity and focus, I will not yet highlight in any detail the key roles of Qatar and Turkey in all of this.

In response to this decision and the subsequent electoral victory of Hamas in Gaza in free and fair elections in Gaza and the West-Bank in 2006, Israel and particularly Egypt under Hosni MUBARAK, convinced and coordinated closely with the Americans (under George W. BUSH) to overturn, subvert and set Hamas up to fail. America, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia (with the cooperation of the Fatah at the time), strictly policed a very hard line that made it impossible and costly to give any legitimacy to Hamas: Hamas needed to fail and be isolated politically, financially and regionally: not even dialogue with Hamas was permitted.

And it is precisely this line that the Israelis, with nods from Cairo and Riyadh, now want to re-establish and of which Operation Protective Edge is not the beginning (it started with the Mursi overthrow in Egypt) nor the end but nonetheless forms an intricate part.

The South African Government at that time, had understood early on that once the Israeli guarantees of the safety of Yasser ARAFAT were removed, the probabilities of his incapacitation or death, rose significantly. And that the Palestinian movement represented by the PLO, would face severe internal difficulties if this were to occur. The Government therefore, presciently and wisely, carefully traversed and crossed these lines in order to keep itself abreast of developments in the ground: we established and maintained discreet channels of dialogue and communication with movements of Political Islam, including with Hamas. As a consequence, we were one of a very few countries in the world that were not surprised by the Hamas decision to participate in the 2006 elections in Gaza, or with their subsequent electoral victory in Gaza.

AZ Hamas Liaison

Khaled MESHAAL Andre ZAAIMAN Osama HAMDAN

When Obama came to power in the USA in 2008 he initially continued to pursue this hard-line position of his predecessors, but was eventually convinced that this situation was no longer tenable or sustainable. When the Arab Spring occurred, the Americans did very little to prop up their former allies in the Middle East, preferring to watch as the people basically coalesced into a popular uprising. This was an important strategic divergence between Israel, a Saudi Arabia and America that was followed eventually by a logical second one: the Obama rapprochement with Iran.

Some countries however will make the serious miscalculation of not correctly reading or adapting to a rapidly changing world. From a risk perspective the three countries in the Middle East that stand out in this respect at the moment, is Israel and the loose alliance it has constructed with Egypt (except for the brief period before the democratically elected Mursi-Administration was overthrown) and Saudi Arabia. The emergence of a new balance-of-forces or of alternative global architectures combined with rapid power shifts may well catch these countries off-guard and ill-prepared.

Judging from the very serious intelligence failure Israel has suffered as part of Operation Protective Edge – Hamas succeeded in building a vast and sophisticated network of underground bunkers, tunnels and factories undetected right under the noses of all the sophisticated Israeli surveillance – the prognosis does not seem very good. Israel is in a state of hubris and has started to believe its own rhetoric to such an extent, that it is behaving irrationally and will continue to make strategic miscalculations based on a misreading of what is going on around them.

Depending on which side of the fence one sits, this may either fill you with optimism or with a sense of alarm.

But this reconfiguration is not only driven horizontally in the form of shifting power-balances between nation states; there is also a vertical dynamic at play: between ordinary people and elites. Ordinary citizens of the world, in all parts of the world without exception, are desirous of profound changes in the way the global commons is governed: politically, economically, financially and socially. The plethora of social protests, uprisings and civic movements – a real yearning for the return of politics and people – that the world has seen over the last 10 years are not only directed specifically against Leader X or Party Y, but are expressions of a much deeper discontent with the “the way the world is organized and works”.

These are indeed the “morbid signs of the inter-regnum” that signals a profound shaking up of the fundamentals, is already underway.

DEVELOPMENT: The Democratic Developmental State in South Africa

The Democratic Developmental State in South Africa post-2014: the path ahead: Part 1/3

©Andre ZAAIMAN

Introduction

The African National Congress (ANC) continues to receive – as demonstrated by the outcome of the recent national elections in the May 2014 – an overwhelming political mandate to govern the country and implement its election Manifesto. It is therefore timeous and apt that we ask: will South Africa continue to move closer to becoming a developmental state? And if so, what will be its purpose, character and impact?

In this series of three articles, we will explore these questions as well as take a closer look at the background and genealogy of this idea; some misconceptions about it; look at some comparative examples; assess how far we have come on this journey in South Africa particularly through the building of a capable State and an effective, efficient and ethical Public Administration; and finally we will attempt to look ahead.

The electoral mandate received by the ANC is democratic and political. Consequently in discussing issues of development, the economy and the state, we must also focus on the relationship between the people, the political and the economic – or the political-economy – and the domestic, regional and international contexts. In interaction these components can be observed, conceptualized and described as a complex and dynamical – therefore heterarchical – system in which the notion of the Developmental State must be centrally located. Our democratic Constitution, conceived upon a similar notion – three interacting, equal spheres – functions from such a philosophical perspective as well, hence there is not only a suitable conceptual and practical fit, but we also avoid thinking along narrow economistic and reductionist lines.

It is also necessary to mention this at the start in order to clearly differentiate this discussion about the South African developmental state from previous historical debates and examples of hierarchical, static, state-directed, centrally planned and often socialist, alternatives. This should not necessarily be interpreted as taking an ideological position about economic values – much is wrong with capitalism – but rather as an attempt to reflect on how to make optimal use of political power in the current conjuncture and context. Or in other words, how to best give expression to the idea that “the people shall govern” by effectively and efficiently implementing the political mandate that the voters of South Africa has just given the ANC through the free expression of their will in Constitutionally proscribed democratic elections. Our developmental state, given this reality, must therefore of necessity, also be a democratic one; we cannot simplistically try to imitate or transplant authoritarian versions from other contexts.

Moreover, in as far as development is concerned, there is a Constitutional imperative that is not often mentioned or discussed. The Constitution (Chapter 10) requires the State to be developmental in its orientation, and that the country must pursue substantive equality. This was eloquently analyzed by Chief Justice Pius LANGA in his 2006 Public Lecture (Stellenbosch) on the radical or transformative nature of our democratic Constitution.

The concept of and the rationale for the democratic developmental state in South Africa is therefore not in dispute: fast, sustained and inclusive growth; moving the most populous part of our dual economy – Black and poor – out of underdevelopment caused by colonial and apartheid dispossession; historical catch-up with developed economies by our national economy as a whole; and building competitiveness into the future. With the polity in South Africa having been fully democratized, key sectors of the economy however still largely function on the basis of cheap African and migrant labour from rural areas – precisely how the colonial and apartheid economies were built – and so the structure of the South African political-economy will have to be fundamentally changed, reformed and retooled.

A democratic developmental State will allow us to do so in an orderly and planned fashion, as we – through targeted State intervention – build a new majority-Black industrial class whilst at the same time expanding, diversifying and growing our industrial base. The twin pressures of a democratized polity and global competition in open markets, create two iron cages from which no Government or political party can insulate itself when it considers its economic policy or political performance.

In this respect I will argue in this Series that the democratic developmental State is a national priority ideally suited as the framework around which an inclusive National Compact can be successfully and productively negotiated and constructed. By combining this with a strategy of industrialization through regional integration – the latter already the consensus position in the African Union – the ANC Government will smartly leverage the investments it has made in Continental renewal over the last 20 years, and which are now beating fruit.

Background and Context

Some initial remarks about the context, both historical and contemporary, are important. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and at the height of neo-liberal triumphalism, it was impossible to raise any critique of free-market capitalism. As Wendy BROWN perceptively argued in her 2003 Essay entitled “Neo-liberalism and the end of liberal democracy”, the logic of the market had not only penetrated spheres where it did not belong – for example the public sphere that pursues the common (not private) good and which must protect or empower the weak against the strong – but also imposed a new form of rationality. Neo-liberalism is generally understood to be the repudiation and replacement of Keynesian welfare state economics with the deregulated, free-market or private sector capitalism associated with Hayek and the Chicago School of political economy. It is also closely associated with the phenomenon that came to be called “globalization”.

As BROWN pointed out: “The neo in neo-liberalism, however, establishes these principles (pre-Keynesian assumptions about the generation of wealth and its distribution) on a significantly different analytic basis as set forth by Adam Smith…Moreover, neo-liberalism is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, maximizing corporate profits, and changing welfarism. Rather neo-liberalism carries a social analysis, that, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policy to practices of empire. Neo-liberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutional and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player”. Wendy Brown: Edgework; pp. 39-40)

Earlier in 1989 in an essay published in The National Interest under the title “The End of History?” Francis FUKUYAMA asked whether we had arrived in a post-ideological world and the triumph of liberal democracy. The ensuing debate gave politics, political agency and the State a bad name and for a while it seemed as though the world was doomed to live the nightmare of market fundamentalism, conservative realism, financialization, militarism and rapidly escalating inequality. For Africa, this situation would have meant remaining locked in the colonial and post-colonial state of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment; a situation that under conditions of democracy, would automatically and rapidly lead to any Government presiding over such a situation, being unceremoniously voted out. The intricate and tenuous relationship between the people, politics in the form of democracy, economics in the form of free-market capitalism and the context quickly became apparent.

In that post Cold War period of conservative liberal – if not belligerent American – hegemony, South Africa and Africa had to steer a very careful course, given the then balance-of-forces internationally and in the case of South Africa, domestically. It was a most dangerous period fraught with enormous risks. The ANC Government realized early on that both the NDR and the project of a developmental state were political, strategic, context-sensitive and would have to be constructed through patience and human agency, effort and ingenuity.

American unipolarity and triumphalist belligerence, gave rise to a conservative liberal orthodoxy which came to be known as the Washington Consensus. It is important to note that the origin and history of the key body of policy measures that came to be known as the Washington Consensus, remains contested. Whilst the British economist John WILLIAMSON claimed that “the story started in the Spring of 1989 when I was testifying before a Congressional committee in favor of the Brady Plan. I argued that it would be good policy to help the debtor countries overcome their debt burden now that they were making profound changes in economic policy, along the lines advocated by Balassa, Bueno, Kuczynski, and Simonsen (1986)”; none other than Joseph STIGLITZ highlighted the fact that the key policy measures contained in the Washington Consensus, actually originated in the rational response of some South American countries to the objective political-economic and social conditions they faced at the time. Regardless of its origins, one of the enduring legacies of the Washington Consensus and how it was politically wielded on the international stage by the USA and other developed countries, was that the State was discredited and fingered as a key problem; particularly when it came to economic and developmental issues. Through viciously policed Structural Adjustment Programs, developed countries coerced developing countries into pursuing the withdrawal and weakening of its States; the deregulation and opening of its markets,; the privatization of its public assets; the reduction of its public debt and the “toeing of the line” internationally.

When the African National Congress became the first democratically elected, and therefore legitimate, Government in the history of South Africa in 1994, it inherited not only a country steeped in racism, division, fragmentation, violent strife, inequality and poverty but also one with an empty fiscus, a large public debt, a dual economy with one part developed and living off an underdeveloped part.

As far back as in its 1997 Discussion Paper entitled “Developing Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy”, the ANC conceptually linked the people, democracy, development and the context; both domestic and international. In what was to become known as the “African Renaissance”, the Discussion Document presciently sets out the following strategic agenda:

1. The recovery of the African continent as a whole
2. The establishment of political democracy on the continent
3. The need to break neo-colonial relations between Africa and the world’s economic powers
4. The mobilization of the people of Africa to take their destiny into their hands thus preventing the continent being seen as a place for the attainment of the geo-political and strategic interests of the world’s most powerful countries; and
5. The need for fast development of people-driven and people-centered economic growth and development aimed at meeting the basic needs of the people.

From an ideological perspective, the implicit anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal stance, emerging from the liberation struggles of the African continent against foreign domination and underdevelopment, in these positions are self-evident and need no further emphasis at this stage. We will however return to these at a later stage as they are central to contentious contemporary debates about the South African economy, growth, industrialization and development.

The ANC and the Developmental State

By 2007 the ANC had articulated its understanding of the Developmental State with specific South African characteristics, and defined its key features:

• The first attribute of a developmental state in our conditions should be its strategic orientation: an approach premised on people-centered and people-driven change, and sustained development based on high growth rates, restructuring of the economy and socio- economic inclusion.

• The second attribute of a developmental state should be its capacity to lead in the definition of a common national agenda and in mobilizing all of society to take part in its implementation. Therefore, such a state should have effective systems of interaction with all social partners, and exercise leadership informed by its popular mandate.

• The third attribute should be the state’s organizational capacity: ensuring that its structures and systems facilitate realization of a set agenda. Thus, issues of macro-organization of the state will continue to receive attention. These include permutations among policy and implementation organs within each sphere, allocation of responsibilities across the spheres, effective inter-governmental relations and stability of the management system.

• The fourth attribute should be its technical capacity: the ability to translate broad objectives into programs and projects and to ensure their implementation. This depends among others on the proper training, orientation and leadership of the public service, and on acquiring and retaining skilled personnel.”

Importantly it also went on to emphasize three additional tasks:

1. Developing the capability to intervene in the economy in the interest of higher rates of growth and development
2. Effecting interventions that address the challenges of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment
3. Mobilizing the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their own liberators through participatory and representative democracy

Following vigorous internal debates and linking the developmental state to the National Democratic a Revolution (NDR), a senior ANC leader at the time – Alec ERWIN – observed:

“A key point will be that neither the NDR nor a developmental state can be taken for granted. It is absolutely essential to understand the complexity of these phenomena. Neither of them can be treated as technical matters that can be brought into existence by political decisions and institutional changes alone, although both of these are important. An NDR is a historically defined possibility requiring a particular conjuncture of class forces. A developmental state is not some stage of development in state formation or a blueprint of governance. A developmental state comes into being when a political movement can translate its political power into a set of institutions that support developmental processes which can be sustained over decades.”
Alec ERWIN: The Developmental a state and the National Democratic Revolution in Ben TUROK (Ed): Wealth doesn’t trickle down: the case for the developmental state in South Africa; p.129; 2008.

ERWIN then went on to argue that even when an appropriate conjuncture for the NDR and for a developmental state may exist, it will not be brought into being in the absence of “strategic and sustained political leadership. This aspect is of great importance, particularly as the consensus in the literature and theory of the developmental state is that it needs to be constructed, usually under adverse conditions, and that a development-oriented leadership, governance and strategy is therefore one of several critical variables for success.

These factors connect the developmental state and statecraft directly: before one talks about a capable State one needs to talk about a competent Government. Sun Tzu in explaining the five factors that will determine victory or defeat in war, placed a particular emphasis on Statecraft too.

By the 2010 National General Council, the ANC Discussion document on economic transformation had concluded that “implementing a more effective development strategy requires a developmental state, in the sense of a state that can co-ordinate all its efforts around core developmental priorities and implement its programs efficiently. A particular problem is that groups with economic power can lobby the state, or even corrupt officials, to achieve favorable policies at the cost of broader transformation. The pressure comes mostly from large companies, backed by threats of disinvestment, and from black entrepreneurs, who use their personal contacts and the claim of equity to obtain political back up and funding.” The National Planning Commission, which had been established in 2009 to design a National Development Plan, launched its Plan in 2012 after extensive, inclusive if not sometimes rancorous debate, division and contestation. The DPSA started the process of building a capable State that is corruption-free, professional, effective, efficient and ethical. In other words, we can conclude that South Africa has already embarked on the journey of building a democratic developmental state – quite an extraordinary achievement given the short space of time and complexity of the task.

Conclusion

It is always useful to start a discussion by clarifying what meanings we ascribe to some of the key concepts that are central to this series. Concepts, as social constructs and linguistic expressions of ideas in ordinary language, can and do, within certain limitations, have different meanings and the particular meanings used, often reflect ideological preferences, contextual realities and power relationships. Their meanings are not fixed but under conditions of hegemony, some singular, specific meaning may be accorded exclusive preference which will make it seem or appear natural. The definition of a meaning is therefore itself a political act – of this we are acutely aware ourselves – and it is therefore also in the interest of transparency that we lay bare the meanings we attribute to different ideas and concepts.

In the next installment in this series, we will look at the concept of a democratic developmental State and highlight some surprising and counter-intuitive aspects of it.

NATIONAL SECURITY : China-US-Africa

 

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NATIONAL SECURITY: navigating the coming rough seas between the USA and China

Part 1: America

©Andre ZAAIMAN

 

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.” Clausewitz

 

Will China and America cooperate, compete or go to war?

The emerging geo-political great game between the USA and China is of great importance to Africa and South Africa. How this great power relationship unfolds will have a commanding influence on the 21st century. As it intensifies, it will remind us that ideology, politics, strategy, money and geography matter; that history has not ended.

The South African Government will have to ensure that South African foreign, security and intelligence policy and strategy consider these developments continuously as they unfold. The recently released Defense Review is therefore significant and timely. It must form part of a more comprehensive, integrated national security review and response. The endless addiction of South African society to domestic political theatre; self-absorbed navel-gazing and our immersion in the conservative, anti-political narrative of technocratic service delivery, has made us myopic, a-political and complacent. This can lead to a general weakening of our strategic position.

South Africa has never needed a well-thought through and articulated Grand Strategy more than now, in order to guide us through a period in the global environment which is initially likely to become more fluid, contested and turbulent.

The future cannot be known; but probability and prediction can be improved as well as surprise avoided, if we are assisted by facts – by a proper understanding of what is going on – as well as by quality information, good theory and off course, secrets. This process of noticing, articulating and characterizing is known in strategic intelligence analysis as “managing the invisible present” – the first step in looking at the future and how it may emerge. However as the renowned Stellenbosch academics Paul CILLIERS and Jannie HOFMEYR have demonstrated, complex and dynamic contexts cannot be properly understood using the classic tools of analytic reductionism. Complexity science with its emphasis on the non-linearity of relationships between multiple components in a system, may provide both a methodological escape and a way to deal with the uncertain, the unexpected and the sudden.

In statecraft, the purpose of intelligence is to provide a competent decision-maker with an informational advantage in the context of threats and opportunities; national security and the pursuit of national goals. As before, events and decisions made by others on distant shores, will have a critical impact on South Africa. Since the world has become hyper-connected and interdependent, events elsewhere will reverberate across the system faster and more directly. The smooth and orderly flow and exchange of goods, information, money, food, energy and people is now of critical importance for the domestic stability of each country – movement becomes as important as access and relationships. Albert O HIRSCHMAN (National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 1980) made compelling arguments to demonstrate how dependency and domination can arise out of foreign trade relations and how the power to interrupt or disrupt commercial or financial flows or relations with other countries, is a determinant of a country’s power position. In other words a country trying to make the most out of its strategic position with respect to its own trade will try to create conditions which make the interruption or disruption of trade of much graver concern to its trading partners than to itself.

According to Bryan MCGRATH, naval expert at the Hudson Institute (War on the Rocks, 25 June 2014) the central proposition of the US Naval Strategy is “that there is a global system in place that works to the benefit of the people of United States and all other nations who participate in it. The system consists of tightly interconnected networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance, and the strategy posits that U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the system.” Some American maritime strategists already worry that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) can now field robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities along their key maritime trade routes, that are threatening to make US power projection increasingly risky and, in some cases and contexts, prohibitively costly.   The control over these flows and exchange, until now enforced and policed by the USA and its Western allies through norms, rules and institutions created by themselves and backed up by the coercive power of the globally-deployed US Military – is increasingly contested and some would argue, breaking down.

The launch of the New Development Bank (NDB) and of the Contingency Reserve Fund ((CRF) by the BRICS-countries in July 2014 is a powerful signal that developing countries are no longer willing to play second fiddle on the global stage. A senior official of the ruling African National Congress in South Africa, Obed BAPELA, commenting in the ANC Today newsletter of 18 July 2014 noted that “The Sixth BRICS Summit just concluded in the picturesque coastal city of Fortaleza. This was a historic and seminal moment in the post-Bretton Woods era since the BRICS Leaders witnessed the BRICS Finance Ministers signing the two founding agreements on the New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). President Zuma has hailed the establishment of the NDB as “an everlasting legacy that will change the face of global economics and the face of all the developing world for better”. The desired post-Bretton Woods era does not only contain different global financial institutions – not controlled by the USA – but some analysts believe, also rests on different values. Writing in The Huffington Post of 17 July 2014, Parag KHANNA in an article entitled “New BRICS Bank a Building Block of Alternative World Order”, notices that “The New Development Bank was therefore not just born out of resentment over the World Bank and IMF’s main donors stubbornly clinging to their over-weighted voting shares. It also reflects a difference in philosophy over the need to prioritize physical infrastructure over other priorities (such as education, healthcare, women’s rights, etc.) towards which the World Bank has been drawn in recent decades. From a holistic point of view, all such investments are crucial for equitable national prosperity and wellbeing, but nothing creates jobs and literally drives ‘state-building’ like infrastructure.”

As the current global architecture decomposes, the resultant vacuum and ideological contestation in the interregnum may lead to adventurism, friction and conflict. [Note the current US-Russian stand-off over Ukraine]. The world therefore also needs new political institutional arrangements that are representative of the shifts in the balance-of-forces. For theorists of hegemonic wars such as A.F.K ORGANSKI, Jacek KUGLER and George MODELSKI this coincides with a high-risk and dangerous moment in world history when a rising power starts to challenge an existing hegemon; a historical moment that when viewed from the longue duree, frequently ended in vicious trade disputes and eventually in large-scale war.

President Barack OBAMA has made it clear that America does not want its relationship with China “to become defined by rivalry and confrontation”. Rejecting the basic premises of the theorists of hegemonic wars he, in the words of his National Security Advisor, Tom DONLIN “disagrees with the premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an established power are somehow destined for conflict. There is nothing preordained about such an outcome.” In an interview with David REMNICK in The New Yorker in January 2014, OBAMA confirmed that what he needs isn’t any new grand strategy: “I don’t really even need George KENNAN right now”—but, rather, the right strategic partners. “There are currents in history and you have to figure out how to move them in one direction or another,” RHODES said. “You can’t necessarily determine the final destination. . . . The President subscribes less to a great-man theory of history and more to a great-movement theory of history—that change happens when people force it or circumstances do.” [Later, OBAMA told me ‘I’m not sure Ben is right about that. I believe in both.]”

This private denial is revelatory and provides us with important information. It also raises an important question: which currents and waves are America riding in the advancement of their goals and the implementation of their strategy? The correct answer to this question will unlock a treasure trove of information and needs to be probed further.

For American scholars like John MEARSHEIMER (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001) there is a limited role in international affairs for either intelligent leadership or for diplomacy, because in his view, as powers gain economic strength, they will pursue the acquisition of coercive, military power. And this in turn will lead to conflict making the idea that economic interdependence contributes to peace, a delusion. Currently China, India, Japan and Russia are all in the process of rapidly modernizing their military forces.

President Barack OBAMA reconfirmed the main currents of his thinking in his 2014 West-Point speech: “In such circumstances, we should not go it alone.  Instead, we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action.  We have to broaden our tools to include diplomacy and development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to international law; and, if just, necessary and effective, multilateral military action.  In such circumstances, we have to work with others because collective action in these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly mistakes.”

Grand Strategy declares long-term intentions and how all instruments of national power will be wielded over time in the pursuit of specific goals. Whilst rejecting rivalry and confrontation with China, OBAMA at the same time, reconfirmed his adherence to the Doctrine of American Preponderance – albeit articulated softly as “global American leadership”. In other words his intent is to arrest the decline in US hegemony that started with its disastrous military invasions of Iraq in 2003 – the latter an inflection point in post-Cold War history correctly read as such at the time by a small team of South African national security experts working with then President Thabo MBEKI that included Lindiwe SISULU, Aziz PAHAD, Welile NHLAPO, Super MOLOI, Thembi MAJOLA and myself. South Africa took an unusually strong and public position against that invasion and it was precisely Shock-and-Awe in Iraq that woke the Chinese and Russian military from their complacency and aroused their suspicions of American grand-strategic encirclement and containment. That invasion and the manner in which it was conducted, is directly linked to the unfolding great power dynamic between the US, China, Russia and India.

Giovanni ARRIGHI in his New Left Review article of 2005 entitled Hegemony Unravelling, refers to the works of David HARVEY (The New Imperialism) and Thomas MCCORMICK (America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After) and remarks: “The attempted implementation of the (Neo-Conservative) plan through the unilateral decision to invade Iraq, Harvey argues, ‘created a bond of resistance . . . between France, Germany and Russia, even backed by China’. This sudden geopolitical realignment made it ‘possible to discern the faint outlines of a Eurasian power bloc that Halford Mackinder long ago predicted could easily dominate the world geopolitically’.In light of Washington’s longstanding fears that such a bloc might actually materialize, the occupation of Iraq takes on an even broader meaning: Not only does it constitute an attempt to control the global oil spigot—and hence the global economy—through domination over the Middle East. It also constitutes a powerful us military bridgehead on the Eurasian land mass which, when taken together with its gathering alliances from Poland down through the Balkans, yields it a highly significant geo-strategic position with the potential to disrupt any consolidation of a Eurasian power; and which could indeed be the next step in that ‘endless accumulation of political power’ that must always accompany the equally endless accumulation of capital.”

As far back as in 1997 Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, writing in Foreign Affairs, asserted that:”Eurasia is home to most of the world’s politically assertive and dynamic states. All the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia. The world’s most populous aspirants to regional hegemony, China and India, are in Eurasia, as are all the potential political or economic challengers to American primacy. After the United States, the next six largest economies and military spenders are there, as are all but one of the world’s overt nuclear powers, and all but one of the covert ones. Eurasia accounts for 75 percent of the world’s population, 60 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. Collectively, Eurasia’s potential power overshadows even America’s. Eurasia is the world’s axial supercontinent. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America’s global primacy and historical legacy.”

In the same article of 1997, BRZEZINSKI went on to say: “In the short run, the United States should consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia. This strategy will put a premium on political maneuvering and diplomatic manipulation, preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition that could challenge America’s primacy, not to mention the remote possibility of any one state seeking to do so. A sustainable strategy for Eurasia must distinguish among the more immediate short-run perspective of the next five years or so, the medium term of 20 or so years, and the long run beyond that. Moreover, these phases must be viewed not as watertight compartments but as part of a continuum… By the medium term, the foregoing should lead to the emergence of strategically compatible partners which, prompted by American leadership, might shape a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security system. In the long run, the foregoing could become the global core of genuinely shared political responsibility.” In other words he proposed making regimes compatible with US values and interests whilst pursuing counter-alliance disruption, building (co-)dependence that must lead to (inter)-dependence. Zbigniew BREZEZINSKI expanded on these ideas in his subsequent two books: The Grand Chessboard:American primacy and its geo-strategic imperatives (1997) and Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (2013)

This exposes a major and long-standing American anxiety: the biggest medium term threat to US hegemony and preponderance, lies – from a US perspective – in a deepened rapprochement between Germany and Russia. It also tells us why the US Government so actively pursues the destabilization of the Ukraine: it wants to maintain friction between Germany and Russia; prevent rapprochement from deepening and build a geo-political buffer. And it explains why America, through its NSA, is spying in such a comprehensive manner on its own ally: Germany.

OBAMA therefore aims to restore the traditional sources of American hegemony – US economic, financial, rule-making and ideological or soft power. Tom DONLIN goes on to say that “the United States is implementing a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy: it is an effort that harnesses all elements of U.S. power—military, political, trade and investment, development and our values.” In as far as Asia is concerned “the overarching objective of the United States in the region is to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms.” This Strategy rests on five pillars: 1. strengthening US alliances particularly with Japan; 2. deepening partnerships with emerging powers particularly with India; 3. building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; 4. empowering regional institutions; and 5. helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity.

In trying to read and interpret the current context correctly – and starting with the American side -the above facts create an interesting analytical dilemma: OBAMA has publicly rejected the Data Modeling and warnings of the theorists of hegemonic wars on the one hand; but on the other hand, he has clearly stated his intention to not only continue to pursue American hegemony but to restore and rebuild it.

The progressive American scholar Noam CHOMSKY (TomDispatch of 01 July 2014) argues that successive US Governments are all pursuing the same objective; they just develop new pretexts and enemies as they go along – unintentionally affirming OBAMA’s claim that American Grand Strategy remains unchanged. CHOMSKY hones in on the ideological and argues that US security policy does not aim to secure “the people” but rather the US ideology of private sector capitalism built around an elite group of banks, financial institutions and the military-industrial complex. He refers to the SNOWDEN revelations and quotes the prominent liberal scholar and government adviser Samuel HUNTINGTON: “The architects of power in the United States must create a force that can be felt but not seen.  Power remains strong when it remains in the dark; exposed to the sunlight it begins to evaporate.” HUNTINGTON wrote that in 1981, when the Cold War was again heating up, and he explained further that “you may have to sell [intervention or other military action] in such a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting. That is what the United States has been doing ever since the Truman Doctrine.” In trying to solve our analytical dilemma and without revealing any secrets, it might be useful to start by looking again at the facts.

The impact of the incipient US-Chinese and Western-Russian contestation and ongoing strategic re-positioning, is already starkly visible in regions across the globe stretching from Ukraine or Crimea; the South and East China Seas; or in the Middle East. The African continent has not been spared with the large-scale but diffused physical American military and economic presence across the whole continent as part of a far-reaching American maneuver ironically known as the Pivot to Asia, now the most visible red flag. This American military deployment in Africa has until recently, largely gone unnoticed but its scale and depth has caused some policy-makers to call this US geo-strategic maneuver “the Pivot to Africa” instead. Its landward presence is constantly and stealthily being expanded through leadership training, anti-terrorism, anti-poaching and anti-organized crime or joint military-exercise “partnership” initiatives in all regions of Africa.

US Defense and its public and private security arms, are re-positioning themselves for new and not-so-new forms of kinetic and non-kinetic interventions aimed at shaping environments, building or breaking alliances and weakening adversaries. This will include complex informational and media warfare; economic, trade and currency interventions; as well political subversion. In a hyper-connected world, the maritime capabilities for anti-access and area-denial, flow-throttling or systems control and disruption, become critical. For example world trade, conducted in US Dollars via digital informational platforms, moves and happens through shipping and therefore seas, sea lanes, harbors, coastal borders and navies – both commercial and military – are key elements in the new mix of challenges confronting us. Destabilizing adversarial regimes or alliances through economic warfare, disrupting trade flows and support for tech-savvy youth groups, efforts at regime delegitimization and strengthening oppositional forces, will be escalated.

The 2013 book of Juan ZARATE “The Treasury’s War: unleashing a new era of financial warfare” which lifted the lid on these new national security tools developed and deployed by the US Government since 2011, is a warning of things to come. In July 2014 REUTERS reported that the French bank BNP Paribas had pleaded guilty to two criminal charges laid against it by the US Treasury, and agreed to pay almost $9 billion to resolve accusations it violated U.S. sanctions against Sudan, Cuba and Iran, a severe punishment aimed at sending a clear message to other financial institutions around the world. Behind this lies an even more important fact: the US will go to extraordinary lengths to maintain the supremacy of the US Dollar as the worlds reserve currency – a critical element in maintaining US hegemonic control.

Whilst the Pivot – often called “re-balancing” – has lead America to build its presence in the Asia Pacific region, it is also trying to extend its North Atlantic hegemony southwards towards the Central Atlantic region, making the entire Western Rim of Africa a critical part of this geo-political shift – a practical manifestation of the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This will prevent or disrupt the emergence of a BRICS-oriented, Brazilian-lead South American and South African-lead African security community developing in the Central Atlantic. And it will make Nigeria, not a BRICS member, a more important geo-strategic player. The Northern African Rim, following the 2011 Franco-American military intervention in Libya in particular, already forms part of a broader European-led Mediterranean security and influence zone as articulated in the Lisbon Concept adopted by NATO; also in 2011. This new focus on the seas and oceanic Rims is neither limited to Africa nor is it a coincidence as it is all part of a deliberate US-European geo-political repositioning.

Although both pivoting and the modern variant of geo-strategy is often traced back to the 1904 article of the British geographer H. MACKINDER (The Geographical Pivot of History, 1904) in which he proposed a land-based, heartland theory of geo-politics, it was his critic Nicholas SPYKMAN (The Geography of the Peace, 1944) drawing on the work of the American naval theorist Alfred MAHAN (The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, 1890 – an influential study on the role of the navy and of sea-power on the rise of the British Empire), that developed a complementary counter-argument of a sea-based, rimland theory of geo-strategy. Whilst MACKINDER argued that Eurasia – incorporating both contemporary Russia and China – were the heartland around which world domination pivoted; and therefore whoever controlled it would control the world – SPYKMAN in turn argued that the sea-lanes and ocean Rim around the heartland, in particular the South and East China Seas, were the key geographical areas from which the heartland and thus the globe could be dominated. From a South African perspective, this would make the Eastern Rim of Africa, as important as its Northern and Western Rims.

It is therefore not insignificant that not only the US and China but also India, Russia, Japan and Brazil have all heavily invested in their naval capabilities over last five years. Chinese stability depends on peaceful development and American preponderance on military domination and control over the Dollarized global financial system. Both China and Russia fear that the USA is busy with an elaborate and incipient maneuver of encirclement and destabilization as part of a broader strategy of containment. South Africa fears that Africa and South Africa itself, will get embroiled in this American maneuver with negative consequences for our key national security goal: political-economic transformation as part of a broader African revival. America fears that China – with or without its Allies – will rival and pose a threat to US Preponderance or hegemony; or that West and East Europe would unite. Whilst the physical and material consequences of US-Chinese repositioning are visible, the much-less visible political and ideological dimensions that undergird this, may not be less important.

The American scholar Charles A. KUPCHAN (The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana, Security Studies, 23:2, 219-257) argues that “…understanding and managing international change requires examining not just shifts in material power, but also the associated contest among competing norms of order. Transitions in the international distribution of power produce not only novel hierarchies, but also novel brands of international order that rest on the social and ideological proclivities of newly powerful states in the system.” This is because “as great powers rise, they, as a matter of course, seek to extend to their expanding spheres of influence, the norms that provide order within their own polities.”

In September 2002, then US President George W. BUSH articulated the Grand Strategy of the United States of America as follows: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.” Following his announcement in November 2011 of an American Pivot to Asia in a speech in Canberra and later rephrased as re-balancing, President Barack OBAMA has consistently maintained that the core elements of the existing Grand Strategy – US Preponderance and the defense, preservation and extension of the values of “freedom, liberal-democracy and free enterprise” – remain in tact. These three components, and the way it has been turned into a global hegemonic praxis through constructs such as “globalization” and US coercion immediately after the end of the Cold War, have come together under the term “neo-liberalism”.

The 20 March 2003 American “Shock-and-Awe” military invasion of Iraq was precisely the start of this hegemonic praxis based on neo-liberal ideology, geo-strategy and coercion.

This particular brand of liberalism – now known as anti-statist neo-liberalism, lead Henry GIROUX (Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture and the Promise of Higher Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere in the Harvard Educational Review 72/4 of Winter 2002) to remark that: “Neoliberalism has become the most dangerous ideology of the current historical moment. It assaults all things public, mystifies the basic contradiction between democratic values and market fundamentalism, and weakens any viable notion of political agency by offering no language capable of connecting private considerations to public issues. Under the rule of neoliberalism, politics are market driven and the claims of democratic citizenship are subordinated to market values. What becomes troubling under such circumstances is not simply that ideas associated with freedom and agency are defined through the prevailing ideology and principles of the market, but that neoliberalism wraps itself in what appears to be an unassailable appeal to common sense. As Zygmunt BAUMAN notes, ‘What. . . makes the neo-liberal world-view sharply different from other ideologies— indeed, a phenomenon of a separate class — is precisely the absence of questioning; its surrender to what is seen as the implacable and irreversible logic of social reality.’Also lost is the very viability of politics itself.”

Peter MAIR subsequently noted in his essay Ruling the Void published in the New Left Review of November/December 2006, that under Tony BLAIR “…the role of ‘progressive’ politics was not to provide solutions from above, by exercising the ‘directive hand’ of government, but to bring together ‘dynamic markets’ and strong communities so as ‘to offer synergy and opportunity’. In Tony BLAIR’s [a key proponent and advocate of the 2003 Iraq invasion] ideal world, politics would eventually become redundant. As one of his close cabinet colleagues was later to remark, ‘depoliticizing of key decision-making is a vital element in bringing power closer to the people’. At one level, this was a simple populist strategy—employing the rhetoric of ‘the people’ in order to suggest that there had been a radical break with past styles of government. At another, however, it gelled perfectly with the tenets of what were then seen as newly emerging schools of ‘governance’ and with the idea that ‘society is now sufficiently well organized through self-organizing networks that any attempts on the part of government to intervene will be ineffective and perhaps counterproductive’. In this perspective, government no longer seeks to wield power or even exercise authority. Its relevance declines, while that of non-governmental institutions and practices increases. In Ulrich Beck’s terms, the dynamic moves from Politics, with a capital ‘P’, to politics with a lower-case one, or to what he has called ‘sub-politics’ Anti-political sentiments were also becoming more evident in the policy-making literature of the late 1990s.

MAIR continues “In 1997, an influential article appeared in Foreign Affairs expressing the concern that government in the US was becoming ‘too political’. Its author, Alan Blinder, a leading economist and deputy head of the Federal Reserve, suggested extending the model of independent Central Banks to other key policy areas, so that decisions on health, the welfare state and so on would be taken by non-partisan experts.The role of politicians in policy-making would be confined to those areas in which the judgement of experts would not suffice to legitimize outcomes. Similar arguments were emerging in the European context. In 1996, for example, Giandomenico Majone argued that the role of expert decision-making in the policy-making process was superior to that of political decision-making in that it could take better account of long-term interests.” South Africa was not spared from this Western hegemonic coercion then and it will not be spared from it in the future.

The ANC Government under Presidents MANDELA and MBEKI had to chart a very careful path amidst dangerously constrained external and domestic environments. The global environment has significantly changed, despite American grand strategic intentions remaining the same, and the international balance-of-power has very slowly begun to shift. Whilst we need to use the opportunity to domestically reintroduce the state, politics and political debate in South Africa – the anti-politics machine must be stopped – we need to do so with wisdom and as part of a broad national consensus or compact. There can be no democracy without the demos; and in national security when the chips are down, there still remains only two final arbiters: capabilities and the national will of the people.

As the ANC Government under President ZUMA pursues our path in BRICS and builds a democratic developmental state aimed at fast sustained, sustainable and inclusive growth, we need to bear in mind that internationally, the intricate sets of competing great power interests and grand strategies create fertile conditions for misperception, miscommunication and miscalculation. Nonetheless nothing should deter us from enhancing the competitiveness and performance of our economy, building equity in our society or the deepening of our democracy and national will; this can only occur through the comprehensive transformation and realignment of our current dysfunctional political-economy and skewed social realities.

South Africa should remain an active, constructive and consensus-building participant in the ongoing process in which the phenomenal potential of our Continent and its people is finally being realized – our future and the future of our continent can never be separated. This in turn will require us to be wise shepherds in shaping a new, progressive global governance architecture – financial, political, economic, security and culture – and an ideological praxis in which people and politics will claim their rightful place.

The next Post will analyze the strategy and approach of the Peoples Republic of China